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I. AN INTRODUCTION
Energy revolutionized the world during the last decade. The Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) came out of the
shadow of the multinational oil companies and became an independent
force in world affairs. Vast economic wealth and power were trans-
ferred from the western industrialized countries to the member nations
of OPEC. Rising energy costs triggered severe inflation in most coun-
tries, threatening the stability of those countries heavily dependent on
Middle Eastern oil. Energy weakened the foundation of the western
alliance as the western European nations and Japan began to reexam-
ine their ties to the United States in light of their need for continued
access to Mid-East oil. Finally, energy raised questions about the ex-
isting relationships between the United States, Canada, and Mexico
and led to calls for the formation of a North American Community.'
* This article was sponsored by Governor Brown's Energy Advisor, Wilson Clark.
and the Governor's Office of Planning and Research. Wade Rose, assistant to Wilson Clark
contributed to the research and conceptual organization of the article. The authors would
like to thank Kay Mowery and Claudia Buckner for their valuable research and editorial
assistance.
1. The concept of a North American Community has received considerable attention
in the last year from policymakers, the academic world, and the popular press. Governor
Brown called a conference of Canadian and Mexican officials in August 1979 to discuss the
concept. Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) held two sets of hearings on the subject; see North
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Energy, and in particular American access to Canadian and Mexi-
can energy reserves, was once considered the principal reason for the
creation of a North American Community. Indeed, some American
commentators argued that the two were linked by logical necessity.
2
That argument was based on two premises. First, the United States
needs new supplies of oil and natural gas. It can no longer rely on
Middle East oil because of the political and economic instability in that
region.3 Nevertheless, its internal demand grows at a faster rate than
American Economic Interdependence, I & I1. Hearings Before the Subcommitee on Interna
tional Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess, (June 6, 1979, and
Oct. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings I and Hearings .[]. For general articles on the
subject, see Safir, North American Market Could Beneft Us Ai, NAT'L. LAW J., Nov. 26,
1979, at 29; Meyer, Why a North American Common Market Won't Work-Yet, FORTUNE,
Sept. 10, 1979, at 18.
The most comprehensive analysis was conducted by the Dean Rusk Center for Interna-
tional and Comparative Law for the National Governors Association. See THE DEAN RUSK
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, COM-
PARATIVE FACTS ON CANADA, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: A FOUNDATION FOR
SELECTIVE INTEGRATION AND TRILATERAL COOPERATION (F. Huszagh, Exec. Dir. 1979)
(copy on file at the Office of Planning and Research) [hereinafter cited as DEAN RUSK RE-
PORT]. The reader is referred to the 276-page report, with bibliography, for an overall view
of the internal and North American policies of all three countries.
The Rusk Center also prepared a 30-page memorandum, entitled North American Co-
operation: An Agenda of Interim Proposals for a North American Council which contains a
proposal for a North American Council. The Council proposed in the memorandum is a
more limited proposal than the one contained herein. It would be a forum for consultations
rather than negotiations and would include regional officials and private citizens, rather
than being a government-to-government organization. Although the authors reject this ap-
proach for reasons that are apparent in the paper, the serious student of this subject is re-
ferred to the work of the Dean Rusk Center.
2. Kenneth Hill, author of one of the first papers on the proposed North American
Common Market for Energy, argued:
[U.S.] dependence on Middle Eastern oil imports need not exist if we had a North
American energy policy that recognizes the availability of sufficient energy re-
sources on our continent that could, absent nationalistic differences between Ca-
nada, Mexico, and the United States, supply nearly all the legitimate energy
requirements for the three nations for years ahead.
K. Hill, North American Energy; A Proposal for a Common Market Between Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States (Jan. 1, 1979) (unpublished manuscript on file at Office of Plan-
ning and Research). For a comment on the Hill proposal, see C. McWilliams, A Way Out of
the Energy Squeeze, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 8, 1979, at B5, col. 4.
3. Prior to the cut-off of Iranian oil, almost 50% of all oil imported to the U.S. came
from the Middle East: Libya (9.5%); Saudi Arabia (22.6%); United Arab Emirates (5.1%)
Iran (5.5%). SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 96TH CoNO. IST
SESS., THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE ENERGY SYSTEM 12 (Pub. No. 96-45) (M. Conant ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as WESTERN HEMISPHERE].
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its domestic production.4 The second premise is that Canada and Mex-
ico are natural sources of new supply.' Canada and Mexico are consid-
ered generally friendly toward the United States. Moreover, they
would be less likely to cut off the flow of energy for capricious or puni-
tive reasons, it is argued, because of the effect such an action would
have on their overall relations with the United States.
This consumption-oriented United States perspective has inhibited
full discussion of the North American Community. Canada and Mex-
ico have been dubious about the idea of a North American Community
because they see it as nothing more than a thinly veiled American at-
tempt to further dominate and exploit their resources. 6 Canada and
4. U.S. Oil Needs
(Million Barrels/Day)
YEAR DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IMPORTS
1980 17-20 10.4 7-10
1985 18-22 10.9 7-11
1990 20-25 11.4 9-14
U.S. Natural Gas Needs
(Billion Cubic Feet/Day)
YEAR DOMESTIC DEMAND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IMPORTS
1980 51.8 47.7 4.1
1985 53.7 46.3 7.4
1990 55.0 46.3 8.7
Id. at 10, 17.
5. Canada has large natural gas reserves and produces substantially more than it needs
for domestic production. By 1990, exports are expected to exceed 1.5 trillion cubic feet per
year. ld. at 37. Canada also has. large oil reserves, particularly the Alberta tar sands, and
may produce 1.3 million barrels of oil per day by 1990. Id. at 30.
Mexico is rich in oil and gas reserves. The most recent official estimate of all reserves is
50 billion barrels (Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1980 at 18, coL 1), but unofficial estimates range as
high as 200 billion barrels. Id. at 45. There is some disagreement about Mexican natural
gas reserves. Estimates range from 45-80 trillion cubic feet. Id. at 49.
6. Canada and Mexico both fear that selling their energy to the United States would
increase what they perceive as excessive reliance on the United States. This fear was suc-
cinctly stated by one Canadian commentator "It is certainly clear that a continental energy
policy-as it is discussed in the United States-would virtually seal the fate of Canada as an
independent state." C. PENTLAND, THE CANADIAN DILEMMA 5 (1973). This attitude is as
prevalent in Mexico as it is in Canada.
The linkage of energy and economic cooperation, as well as the lack of a definition of
the North American Community, has been extremely detrimental to the discussion of this
idea. Indeed, these two factors have caused many leaders to reject the notion of North
American as opposed to bi-lateral cooperation. Prime Minister Trudeau and President 16-
pez Portillo, for example, issued a joint statement at the conclusion of President I.pez Por-
tillo's visit to Canada on May 28, 1980. In it they stated.
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Mexico will not allow that result. Furthermore, such a policy would
not be in the best interest of the United States since it needs to lessen its
dependence on oil and other non-renewable resources more than it
needs a new, unlimited source of supply.
Energy, then, may be important to the notion of a North American
Community, but not in the way previously assumed. Energy is impor-
tant because it equalizes the relationship between Canada, Mexico, and
the United States. For the first time, the United States needs Canada
and Mexico as much as Canada and Mexico need the United States. In
the past, the United States could use its economic power to dominate its
neighbors.7 Energy changes that balance of power. Now, because the
United States needs Canada and Mexico in a way almost inconceivable
10 years ago, Canada and Mexico can use their energy resources to
The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on current informal pro-
posals for trilateral economic cooperation among Canada, Mexico and the United
States and agreed that such an approach would not serve the best interests of their
countries. The President of Mexico reiterated to the Prime Minister of Canada his
view that these proposals were incompatible with Mexico's social and economic
development objectives, since the great disparity among the levels of development
of the three countries would mean that any benefit resulting from such a union
would be distributed unevenly, thereby emphasizing existing differences, and with
the additional risk of endangering Mexico's sovereign ability to decide on the ap-
plication of its economic policies. The Prime Minister expressed the view that Ca-
nada's interests would best be advanced by the continued strengthening of bilateral
relations with Mexico and the United States and that these were unlikely to be
enhanced by mechanisms for comprehensive trilateral economic cooperation. He
noted that the structures for bilateral cooperation in the energy field would not be
improved by adopting a continentalist energy approach.
(Copy of statement obtained from Canadian Consul, on file in Office of Planning and Re-
search).
In essence, the leaders stated that a North American Community was not in the interests of
their countries.
If a North American Community means a common market or free American access to
Canadian and Mexican energy, then the authors agree with Prime Minister Trudeau and
President L6pez Portillo. The same conclusions are drawn herein. However, the North
American Community, as defined in this paper, does not mean either a common market or a
free access to energy. It is a forum in which the countries would negotiate solutions to their
common problems. It would not threaten Mexico's sovereignty or economic development,
nor would it jeopardize the bilateral relations between any two of the countries.
7. The differences in economic strength are striking:
GNP PER CAPITA ONP
(Billion 1978 dollars) (1978 dollars)
United States 2,106.9 9,640
Canada 196.6 8,323
Mexico 76.2 1,148
H. BLOCK, THE PLANETARY PRODUCT: PROGRESS DESPITE "THE BLUES," 1977-78, at 43
(1979) (published by U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs).
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forge a new relationship with the United States and with each other.
This new relationship will replace domination with equality, depen-
dence with interdependence.
A North American Community created to foster equality and in-
terdependence would benefit all three countries. It should have three
goals. First, it should encourage continental cooperation. The North
American countries are already bound to one another by geography
and economics. The North American Community can be the vehicle
for strengthening and increasing the areas in which the countries coop-
erate. Second, such an organization should also promote comprehen-
sive, trilateral problem-solving. Comprehensive negotiations, in the
sense of negotiations among all three countries, can achieve results not
possible in bilateral, issue-by-issue negotiations. Finally, the North
American Community must preserve the independence and sover-
eignty of all three countries. One of the main themes in North Ameri-
can history has been Canadian and Mexican fears that the United
States intended to conquer or to assimilate them. The United States
has also jealously maintained its independence and freedom of action.
Unless the Community provides institutional safeguards for the sover-
eign rights of the member countries, it cannot succeed.
This paper presents a discussion of the need for and the possible
forms of the North American Community. It begins with a discussion
of the value of such an organization in terms of the existing relation-
ships among the North American countries. The second section dis-
cusses the goals of the Community. The paper concludes with an
analysis of two possible forms for the organization and rejects a com-
mon market for economic, political, and legal reasons. Instead, the pa-
per offers the idea of cooperative organization, one which stresses
equality and unanimity, as the most appropriate form for the North
American Community.
II. EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS
Inextricably intertwined, Canada, Mexico, and the United States
each protects and asserts its identity and independence. The history of
the North American continent reads, in part, as an effort to keep these
strong forces in balance, preventing both assimilation and self-destruc-
five provincialism.
The balance is a delicate one. On the one end of the scale is inter-
dependence-the economic and geographic ties that bind the entire
continent together, notwithstanding occasional political rhetoric to the
No. 3]
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contrary. These forces are strong, deeply rooted, and so much a part of
daily life that they are taken for granted. On the other end of the scale
is political ambivalence which at times brings the countries together as
friends and at other times forces them into more retrenchment behind
protectionist fences that keep out invading armies of soldiers, tourists,
goods, or currency.
When one end of the scale is overloaded, the stability of the rela-
tionship is threatened. Too much interdependence brings up national-
istic political statements. Too much political independence makes the
economic engine cough and sputter, to the detriment of private citizens
and public affairs.
A. Interdependence-Geographic and Economic
Geographic ties are obvious from the most cursory look at a map.
North America is a huge land mass stretching approximately from 50
miles south of the North Pole to 1500 miles north of the equator. It is
occupied by three major countries. Canada borders only one nation,
the United States only two, Mexico only three. Thousands of miles
long, the borders between the three countries are virtually undefended.
This results in a continent that has many overlapping cultural ties.
The western provinces of Canada have much in common with the west-
ern United States.' The Quebec government has cultural and trade
missions in the United States, and focuses its efforts on centers of
French culture in Louisiana and New England.9 The southwest United
States (and California in particular) has a large Spanish-speaking mi-
nority tracing its roots from the days of Spanish and Mexican rule."'
8. The Canadian Move Toward U.S. Statehood, San Francisco Sunday Examiner and
Chronicle, Apr. 20, 1980, § B, at 7.
9. Holsti & Levy, Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations Between Ca.
nada andthe United States, in CANADA & THE U.S.: TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSOOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS 283, 298-300 (A. Fox, A. Hero, Jr., J. Nye ed. 1976).
10. Spanish and Mexican rule are reflected in legal traditions that affect citizens regard.
less of ethnic background. For example, California's founding documents are in Spanish
and English: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settle-
ment with the Republic of Mexico), Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico (reprinted in CAL.
CONST. (West 1954); laws were to be published in Spanish and English: CAL. CONST. Of
1849, art. XI, § 21 (West 1954). Also, the community property system in the Southwestern
United States is based on Mexican and Spanish law. See generally McMurray, The Begin-
nings of the Community Property System in California and theAdoption of the Common Law,
3 CALIF. L. REV. 359 (1915). In this article, the author concludes:
In both [Texas and California] the community property system was the only part of
the older [Mexican law] that survived the shock of contact with the American com-
mon law. Why this happened, we can only guess. The fact that the few married
people in both communities had entered into marriage under the former system
[Vol, 3
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By 1984 over one third of the people in Los Angeles will be of Latin
descent, and Los Angeles could have the largest concentration of Mexi-
cans in the world outside of Mexico City." Florida has also become a
center of Latin population and culture, with the Latin population of
Miami increasing dramatically from 1960 to 1980.12
Beyond this shared geography and culture, the three countries are
bound together economically. Canada, Mexico, and the United States
are interdependent economically to an extent that is not recognized by
the everyday citizen, much less the countries' leaders.' 3 The United
States accounts for approximately two-thirds of Canadian and Mexican
foreign trade, making the United States the largest trading partner of
both countries. 4 Canada and Mexico are important trading partners
and the inherent fairness of its fundamental idea of a marital partnership doubtless
contributed to preserve the Mexican law upon this subject in both jurisdictions.
Id. at 379.
11. Exploding Ethnic Populations Changing Face of L.4., Los Angeles Times, Apr. 13,
1980, Part II, at I.
12. See NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1980, at 61. Dade County (in which Miami is located) is
currently population by 750,000 whites, 600,000 Latinos, and 250,000 blacks. Thtr JYorld,
San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, June 1, 1980, at 8.
13. President Nixon's famous misstatement in 1971 that Japan, not Canada, was
America's number one trading partner is symptomatic of a national perception, rather than
an isolated aberration. Truitt, Canada and Its North American Problem" The Care for a
Better Understanding, MiCH. ST. U. Bus. Topics 32, 34 (Autumn 1978).
14. The United States accounts for 70% of Canada's imports (S28 billion) and 69% of its
exports ($29 billion). By way of comparison, Japan, Canada's next largest trading partner,
accounts for only 3% of Canadian imports and 6% of Canadian exports. The United King-
dom represents Canada's third largest trading partner with 4% of total Canadian trade (in-
cluding both exports and imports). The United States-Mexican trade statistics are equally
impressive. The United States accounts for 64% of Mexican imports (S3.5 billion) and 67%
of Mexican exports (S2.7 billion). Mexico's next largest trading partners, West Germany
and Japan, account for only 4% and 3% of Mexican trade respectively.
The total figures appear below.
UNITED STATES TRADE
EXPORTS ($118 mil-
IMPORTS ($147 billion) lion) TOTAL TRADE ($264 billion)
I. Canada 20% 1. Canada 21% 1. Canada 21%
2. Japan 13 2. Japan 9 2. Japan II
3. West Germany 5 3. West Germany 5 3. West Germany 5
4. Saudi Arabia 4 4. United Kingdom4 4. United Kingdom 4
5. Nigeria 4 5. Mexico 4 5. Saudi Arabia 4
6. United Kingdom 4 6. Mexico 4
7. Mexico 3
Statistics compiled by the authors from U.S. BUREAU OF TuE CENsus, U.S. GENEM. I.t-
PORTS/WORLD AREA By COMMODITY GROUPINGS (Report FT 155/Annual 1977) at 122, 132,
247, 283, 377, 447,487 (GPO Washington, D.C., 1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S. IspoRtTs/WoRw
AREAS, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. EXPORTS/WORLD AREA BY CoMiODrrY GROUPINGS
(Report FT 455/Annual 1977) 169, 180, 365, 399, 596 (GPO Washington, D.C. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. EXPORTS/WORLD AREAS]
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for the United States, with Canada the largest United States' trading
partner and Mexico the sixth largest.' 5 Canada and Mexico, although
less important to each other than either is to the United States, conduct
a substantial amount of trade. Canada is Mexico's fifth largest trading




1. United States 64%
2. West Germany 6
3. Japan 5
4. Canada 3
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EXPORTS ($4 billion) TOTAL TRADE ($10 billion)
1. United States 67% 1. United States 65%
2. Brazil 4 2. West Germany 4
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UNITED NATIONS, COMMODITY TRADE STATISTICS, 1977 (CANADA) 1, 53 (1977) (Statistical
Papers Series D, Vol 27, No. 1-10) [hereinafter cited as U.N. CANADA STATISTICS].
15. American trade with Canada ($56 billion) exceeds the total trade with America's
next three largest trading partners-Japan ($29 billion), West Germany ($13 billion) and the
United Kingdom ($10 billion). Mexico's importance to the United States is significant (4%
of total trade) considering its size and level of economic development. West Germany and
the United Kingdom, both of which are highly industrialized, account for only 5% and 4% of
American trade, respectively. Moreover, in some areas, Mexican trade is substantially
higher than the overall percentage. For example, almost 10% of all American imports of
food and animals come from Mexico. U.S. IMPORTS/WORLD AREAS, .upra note 14, at 132,
16. Canada, therefore, is more important to Mexico than vice versa. Canada has a
favorable balance of trade with Mexico, importing $181 million worth of goods and export-
ing goods valued at $201 million in 1977. This favorable balance seems to stem from two
factors. First, Canada still retains a strong European orientation. The United Kingdom,
West Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and even Belgium and Luxembourg arc
[Vol. 3
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In addition to trade, the United States has substantial direct in-
vestments in Canada and Mexico. 7 At the end of 1978, worldwide
United States direct investment abroad totaled $168 billion. Of this,
$37 billion was in Canada. This was the largest investment in any indi-
vidual nation. By contrast, American investment in the entire 9-nation
European Economic Community (EEC) totals $55 billion and in Japan
amounts to only $5 billion. United States' direct investment in Mexico
at the end of 1978 was $3.7 billion, the largest share for any Latin
America nation except Brazil.
In contrast, total direct investment in the United States by foreign-
ers at the end of 1978 was $40.8 billion,' 8 of which Canada invested
$6.2 billion (approximately 15%). In contrast, the EEC countries in-
vested $24 billion in the United States, Japan $2.7 billion, OPEC coun-
tries $325 million and Latin American republics (including Mexico)
$579 million. Thus substantial interdependence is represented by di-
rect investment, although the United States plays a much larger role in
Canada and Mexico than either of those countries plays in the United
States.
In addition to trade, the United States and Mexico have become
increasingly intertwined economically through the Border Industries
program (Programa Fronterizera de Industria (PFI), or "maquila" pro-
gram). 9 The "maquila" program allows United States companies to
send parts duty free to Mexican assembly plants, where they are assem-
bled using cheaper Mexican labor and then the finished products are
larger trading partners for Canada than Mexico. Second, Canada buys virtually no oil from
Mexico. Canada buys its oil from the following countries: Venezuela (41%); Saudi Arabia
(22%); Iran (16%); U.S. (9%); Iraq (3%); North Africa (3%); Algeria (2%); Nigeria (1%); Ec-
uador (1%); Egypt (1%). Canada imports less than 1 percent of its imported oil from Mex-
ico. UN CANADA STATISTICS, supra note 14, at 16.
Canada, by increasing its imports from Mexico, could rely less on its other sources,
including the United States. Mexico could use such oil exports to strengthen its relations
with Canada and its independence from the United States.
There are recent indications that Canada and Mexico have agreed to greater trade in
oil. On May 27, 1980, Prime Minister Trudeau and President L6pez Portillo agreed that
Mexico would sell Canada 50,000 barrels per day of oil in return for Canada undertaking
joint investments, transferring technology, and supplying S430 million in credits to export
capital equipment to Mexico. Canada needs the oil as a stable source of supply in the east-
era provinces, replacing imports from the Middle East. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1980, Part 1, at
5.
17. All U.S. foreign investment figures are taken from Whichard, U.S. Direct Invertment
4broad in 1978, 59 (No. 8) SURVEY OF CURRENT BUs. 27 (Part I) (August 1979).
18. Foreign investment figures are taken from Fouch & Lupo, Foreign Direct Investmient
in the United States, 59 (No. 8) SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 47 (Part 1) (August 1979).
19. See generally Bulson, Mexico's Border Industrial Progran: Legal Guidelines/or the
Foreign Investor, 4 DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & PoL'Y. 89 (1974).
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shipped back into the United States with duty paid only for the value
added in the Mexican portion of the process. 20 American companies
save money in labor costs. For Mexico, more jobs at home mean less
emigration and more money spent domestically, which benefits the en-
tire economy. These border industrial plants number over 600, employ
over 110,000 Mexicans and are expanding at a rapid rate.
21
Canada and the United States have gone further by setting up
manufacturing agreements allowing automobiles to be produced jointly
in the United States and Canada for sale in both countries. Established
in 1965, the agreement creates an integrated automotive market by re-
moving duties on trade for specified motor vehicles and new parts.
22
As a result of this bilateral sectoral agreement (i.e. a two-party
treaty covering a discrete segment of the manufacturing economy), au-
tomobile trade between Canada and the United States grew from $740
million m 1964 to $21 billion in 1978. It has grown by $3 billion to $4
billion a year from 1974-79 (over 15% per year).23
The figures on automobiles and border industries show the sub-
stantial economic interdependence that already exists within North
America. There are other factors encouraging cooperation that are
equally compelling. Canada and Mexico both have natural re-
sources-particularly oil and gas-that the United States needs. Oil
20. Items 806.30 and 807 of US Tariff Schedules. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Schedule 8 (1976).
21. Spaeth, The Maquila Boom, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1979, at 102.04; New Interests in Mex-
ican Plants, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 16, 1979, at 42, 43.
22. Canadian Automobile Agreement, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTS TRADE ACT or
1965, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS. 2-3 (Government
Printing Office, 1977) [hereinafter cited as AUTOMOTIVE REPORT]. See text accompanying
notes 109-116 infra for fuller discussion.
23. Hearings .I, supra note I, at 33. Canada was the number one customer for U.S.
automobile exports for the-years 1974-1976, while Mexico was second. THE AUTOMOTIVE
REPORT shows Canada as the leading country of origin for imports into the United States,
while Mexico is not listed. Over 90% of Canada's imports and exports come from or go to
the United States. AUTOMOTIVE REPORT, supra note 22, at 46, 47, 49, 50. Mexico's auto
industry produces almost exclusively for domestic consumption. The major American com-
panies assemble cars there, including Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. All Mexican-
produced automobiles are designed elsewhere and assembled in Mexico. Most of the motor
vehicle exports from Mexico today are parts ($135 million out of $136 million of Mexican
export motor vehicle trade in 1977 to the United States was vehicle parts) (U.S. IM-
PORTS/WORLD AREAS, supra note 14) and $12 million were in parts out of $13 million total
motor vehicles exported to Canada in 1977 (U.N. CANADA STATISTICS, supra note 14). Re-
cently GM was reported to be considering expanding its manufacturing of engines and other
parts for shipment to the U.S. as part of the border industry program. INDUSTRY WEEK,
Apr. 16, 1979, at 43.
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and gas trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico is al-
ready extensive.
Canada, until the early 1970s, was a major supplier of oil to the
United States.24 In 1973, the exports to the United States reached a
high of 1,200,000 barrels per day (bpd). By the early 1980s, however,
oil exports to the United States will end. To offset some of the losses to
refineries in the "northern tier" states from Minnesota to Washington,
a program of oil exchanges ("swaps") began in 1975, sending Canadian
oil to the western United States and (more recently) foreign oil to the
East, thereby avoiding expensive transportation from West to East.
The program has expanded since 1975. In November 1979, 148,000
barrels per day were exchanged across the border with the northern tier
states. 5
Canada has potentially great sources of untapped energy---espe-
cially the Alberta tar sands. There are immense reserves of oil in the
tar sands, but it is very costly to exploit them. Currently, two projects
are operational in Alberta, producing 150,000 bpd. In June 1979, Ca-
nada, the United States, Alberta, and Saskatchewan signed a memo-
randum of understanding to allow the joint development of the Alberta
tar sands. The project includes interpreting existing knowledge and de-
veloping a data base to further expand production of the tar sands, with
the United States contributing its technical expertise in experimental
enhanced recovery techniques.26 Developing the tar sands requires a
massive infusion of capital and technology in order to make it a feasi-
ble source of energy.27 The United States is the most likely source of
this capital and technology.
Canada exports almost one trillion cubic feet of natural gas to the
United States. In 1978, 880 billion cubic feet was exported to the
United States under existing licenses. Although no new export licenses
have been issued in the last 10 years, at recent hearings, the Canadian
National Energy Board said an additional 2 trillion cubic feet of gas
might be available for export in 1979-87.28
Mexico has made substantial discoveries of oil and gas in recent
years, primarily in the Reforma trend, located in southeastern Mexico.
24. Canada was self-sufficient in oil until 1973. By 1978, imports represented 33% of
total Canadian demand. See WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 3, at 28.
25. Seegeneraly DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, EXTERNAL INFORMATION PRO-
GRAMS DIvIsION, VisIT TO CANADA OF U.S. PRESIDTr CARTER, NovE.,dER 1979, at 3 (tab
2) (Ottawa, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CARTER BRIEFING BOOK].
26. Id. at 4 (tab 2).
27. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 56.
28. Id. at 47.
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This area furnished 70% of Mexico's production by 1977-1,085,550
barrels per day. The wells also contain substantial volumes of gas.
Production of natural gas in mid-1978 was 3.63 billion cubic feet per
day (cfd).
29
The United States is the largest consumer of Mexican oil, currently
taking 80% of Mexico's exports. However, this percentage is proposed
to decrease to 60% as the flow increases from new discoveries. In con-
trast to its long standing role as a customer of oil, the United States did
not import natural gas from Mexico before the 1979 agreement.30
B. Political Ambivalence
. FriendshT and Support
Counter-balanced with economic interdependence is the political
ambivalence these three countries share towards each other. The close
friendship of the three becomes obvious in recent crises. Most of
America's allies moved cautiously and reluctantly in response to the
seizure of fifty American diplomatic hostages in Iran. Canada, on the
other hand, quickly supported the United States and actually helped
six other American diplomats to escape, after harboring them in secret
for several months.3 ' The United States, in response to the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, cancelled a multi-million dollar wheat sale to the
Soviet Union and called for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Ca-
nada was one of the first countries to support the proposed transfer of
the games to another site.32 Mexico agreed to buy some of the excess
wheat, thereby alleviating the economic and political pressure in the
United States. Also, Mexico accepted the Shah of Iran in what ap-
peared to be a permanent asylum, prior to his departure for the United
States for medical treatment.33 These examples of support in dealing
with other nations are consistent with a long-standing pattern of friend-
ship for most of the twentieth century.
Other examples abound of more formalized cooperative mecha-
nisms between the three countries. United States and Canadian rela-
29. Grayson, Mexico and the United States: The Natural Gas Controversy, 32 INT Et-
AMERICAN ECON. AFF. J. 6 (Winter 1978).
30. Hearings , supra note I, at 32-33.
31. Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1980, §A, at 1.
32. Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1980, § A, at 10.
33. Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1980, § A, at 19. Mexico refused to allow the Shah to
reenter Mexico after his medical treatment in the United States, in part, because it feared
reprisals against its own diplomatic personnel and, in part, because Mexicans resented
Henry Kissinger's alleged public statements that he was responsible for the Shah's asylum in
Mexico. Washington Post., Dec. 1, 1979, § A, at 13.
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tions, in particular, are shaped by a broad range of formal problem-
solving mechanisms.34
Most prominent and successful is the International Joint Commis-
sion (IJC). Created to carry out the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,
its purpose is to resolve questions related to use of the waters that mark
or flow across the border, as well as other questions related to the com-
mon boundary.35 The Commission has two national sectors with three
members each, working together as a group under the national chair-
man. Members are appointed by their governments but are not in-
structed by them.3 6 The Commission operates by a majority vote of its
six members, regardless of nationality. It makes every effort to work
out cooperative solutions, as evidenced by the fact that only 3 of its first
98 cases have been decided less than unanimously.
37
The Commission has a semi-judicial role--deciding on applica-
tions by citizens or governments to alter levels or flows of lakes and
rivers on the border. Its second function is much more flexible-to
make recommendations to either of the two governments on any prob-
lem "along the common frontier." This authority can include action on
water supply, power, navigation, scenic beauty, and air and water pol-
lution. One of its biggest successes was the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1972, calling for joint United States-Canadian action on
problems related to Lake Erie and Lake Ontario.38
The great strength of the Commission lies in its role as a practical
tribunal with both competence and credibility. It seeks to arrive at rec-
ommendations based on technical or moral reasoning, rather than eco-
nomics or power. National sovereignty does not control its decisions.
As a result, Canada tends to use the Commission more than the United
States, since the United States has more power using other channels.39
The Commission is successful partly because it prepares technical
studies after an extensive hearing process. The factual background
gives the resulting recommendations great weight and political issues
tend to be defused. Another reason for success is that the mechanism
34. A partial listing of such mechanisms appears in Hearings 11 at 5. See generally,
Holsti & Levy, supra note 9.
35. See Ross, International Joint Commissions United States-Canada, 1974 ANIER.
SoC. INT'L L. PROc. 229 [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
36. Scott, Fisheries, Pollution and Canadian-American Transnational Relations, in CA-
NADA & THE U.S.: TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 252 (A. Fox,
A. Hero, Jr., J. Nye ed. 1976).
37. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 23 1.
38. See Scott, supra note 36, at 252-253.
39. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 235-36.
No. :3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
was set up before major problems arose, and common values and a
commitment to negotiate problems were agreed upon before a crisis
erupted.4 °
The United States and Mexico likewise have a border commis-
sion-the United States-Mexican International Boundary and Water
Commission. The Commission concerns itself with issues of boundary
lines and the waters which cross or flow along the border. Its two usual
problems are agreeing on the location of the border when rivers move
and helping to prevent flooding and erosion. Many of the solutions
involve engineering questions that must be resolved, along with juris-
dictional ones. The principal cases recently are disputes over the loca-
tion of boundaries along the Rio Grande when the river shifts course
and disputes over the salinity of the Colorado River as it passes into
Mexico.4 '
The Commission is not as broad in scope as the IJC but has served
well in its over 66 years of operation. Its continuing validity is appar-
ent from the charge it was given on February 16, 1979, by Presidents
Carter and L6pez Portillo to make recommendations for a permanent
solution to the sanitation of waters along the border.4 At a subsequent
meeting on September 29, 1979, both Presidents found the recommen-
dations satisfactory.43
The United States and Mexico have also established a Consulta-
tive Mechanism, begun in February 1977 as a result of the visit of Pres-
ident L6pez Portillo to Washington, D.C. This Consultative
Mechanism provided the foundation for the trade agreement-the first
since 1942-between Mexico and the United States that both Presi-
dents signed on December 2, 1977."
Although limited in scope and volume (covering only 2% of Mex-
ico's exports to the United States and 1% of United States' exports to
Mexico), the Trade Agreement set important precedents. First, it was
between a developed and a developing country and recognized the will-
ingness of the United States to move away from the requirement of
40. See Holsti & Levy, supra note 9, at 287-288.
41. See Jordan, The United States-Mexican International Boundary and Water Conils-
sion, 1974 AMER. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 226, 226-29.
42. Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of Meetings Between President Carter
and President L6pez Portillo, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc, 292 (Feb. 19, 1979) [herein-
after cited as Joint Communique].
43. Visit of President L6pez Portillo, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1791 (Oct. 8,
1979).
44. See Comment, The United States-Mexico Trade 4greement of 1977, 13 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 435 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Mexico Trade Agreement of 1977].
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reciprocity in the concessions made by a third-world country to a de-
veloped country. The agreement was the first bilateral treaty made as a
result of the Tokyo Round (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT)) negotiation. It reflected the principle (newly adopted at the
Tokyo Round) that developed countries should not require concessions
inconsistent with the developing country's financial and trade needs,
notwithstanding the usual GATT requirement of "mutual and recipro-
cal" concessions."5
Second, the Trade Agreement showed the importance of the Con-
sultative Mechanism as a vehicle for continued contact between the
United States and Mexico. The success of the agreement helped estab-
lish the Consultative Mechanism as a formal means for exchange of
information and ideas.' This has been borne out in subsequent con-
tacts, when Presidents Carter and L6pez Portillo agreed to strengthen
the Consultative Mechanism on their February 16, 1979, visit47 and
made the recommendations to strengthen the Mechanism their first
item of business for their third meeting on September 29, 1979.48
2 PoliticalAnimosi y
Examples of political agreement and support contrast sharply with
a long history of political animosity and the fear of conquest, either by
the power of the gun or by the power of the dollar. The history of
Canada can be viewed, in part, as the attempt of peoples who did not
want to be part of the United States to protect themselves from en-
roachment and assimilation.4 9 Mexico has been defeated militarily by
the United States, had its territory annexed to form the southwest
United States, and was invaded as recently as 1916. Mexico's fears of
America's military wrath, however, have been replaced by fear of eco-
nomic dominance.5 0
America's political reaction to its neighbors often has been one of
45. See id. at 447-49.
46. See id. at 439.
47. Joint Communique, supra note 42, at 288.
48. Id. at 292.
49. See Holmes, Impact of Domestic Political Factors on Canadian-Amerlcan Relationr
Canada in CANADA & THE U.S.: TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
20 (A. Fox, A. Hero, Jr., J. Nye ed. 1976).
50. Senator Max Baucus of Montana recently chaired United States Senate hearings on
North American Economic Interdependence. In introducing the hearings, he stated, "[O]ur
neighbors are rightfully cautious about such talk (to establish a North American Common
Market) and even the mention of common markets and free trade zones legitimately and
correctly raises concern.' Hearings I, supra note 1, at 2.
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indifference. The United States tends to take its neighbors for granted,
to assume that Canadians are just like cold-weather Americans and
that Mexico is a source of raw materials, either products or people, to
service the American economy. Only when our neighbors object to in-
different treatment do Americans notice them; then Americans are sur-
prised to learn that the neighboring countries are proud and
independent.
Sometimes confficts arise because of particular actions or policies
of the United States. The United States conduct during the 1977 natu-
ral gas negotiations angered Mexican officials and damaged the rela-
tions between the two countries.5 Similarly, President Nixon's refusal
to exempt Canada from the American economic and monetary meas-
ures of 1971 signalled an end to the so-called "special relationship."
52
Generally, however, Canada's and Mexico's negative reactions are to
the long-term United States' policies or programs they view as eco-
nomic or legal imperialism.
American antitrust policy is a good example of what many
Canadians and Mexicans feel is American legal imperialism. Ameri-
can courts have applied United States' antitrust law to conduct which
takes place totally outside its borders, so long as the conduct has some
effect in the United States.53 This principle, regardless of its impor-
tance to antitrust enforcement, is difficult for Canadian-American rela-
tions. In one case, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
named two Canadian provincial officials as unindicted co-conspirators
in a case alleging a conspiracy to limit the amount of potash produced
in the United States.54 In another case, the Division sought to break up
one uranium cartel that had been organized by the governments of Ca-
nada, Great Britain, France, South Africa, and Australia." These
cases, and others like them, are viewed as legal imperialism for two
reasons. First, they illustrate that the United States intends to enforce
its antitrust policy in Canada, even though economic competition is
viewed differently in Canada than in the United States.56 Second, they
51. See text accompanying notes 158-161 infra.
52. See PENTLAND, supra note 6, at 23.
53. For a general discussion of the concepts of "objective territoriality" and "territorial
effects," see Campbell, The Canada- United StatesAntitrust Notiication and Consultation Pro-
cedure: A Study in Bilateral Conflict Resolution, 56 CANADIAN BAR REv. 459 (1978); see also
Mosher, The LongArm of U.S. Antitrust LawsAntagonizes Foreign Trade Partners, II NAT'L
J. 2028 (Dec. 1, 1979).
54. Campbell, supra note 53, at 486.
55. Mosher, supra note 53, at 2030.
56. The United States, with its economic power, can afford to demand pure competition
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are seen as an attack on Canada's fights as an independent nation.57
United States companies own 45% of Canada's manufacturing in-
dustry and 58% of its mining industry. The United States controls
fewer Mexican businesses because of Mexican legal restrictions. Only
3% of Mexican private, fixed investment is foreign-owned. Of that
amount, however, United States' companies hold 70%.8 Also, as noted
above, the United States has a disproportionately large amount of di-
rect investment in its neighbors, while its neighbors have unusually
high percentages of their trade with the United States. These dispari-
ties in investments and trade between the United States and its neigh-
bors can show that interdependence is extensive. However, when
viewed with the goal of political independence in mind, and coupled
with the large amount of United States ownership in adjacent econo-
mies, it is easy to see why American economic and political dominance
is feared.
C. Seeking a Balance Through Law
The history of the relations among the three North American
neighbors can be viewed as an attempt to balance economic interde-
pendence with political independence. Canada has been described as a
risky experiment based on 'unnatural' economics, 59 primarily because
an east-west political focus has been forced on it by the need to forge a
nation, in the face of more natural and proximate economic relations
flowing on a north-south axis.60 Likewise, Mexico's north-south eco-
nomic linkage with the United States has generated even greater ten-
sions than those in Canada. For example, the Mexican economy has at
various times, such as under President Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) en-
couraged foreign investment, but this action led to revolution and a
within its borders. Less affluent countries, such as Canada, may be more lenient. "Tjbe
destruction of any one of an overall proportionally smaller number of enterprises competing
in the international market, may be much more significant." Campbell, supra note 53, at
484.
57. Whether a decree of a United States court does or does not help to maintain
competition in Canada or prevent the American takeover of a large Canadian firm
. . . is irrelevant. Such benefits are bought at the excessive price of lessening Ca-
nadian sovereignty and, if deemed desirable, could be achieved directly by Cana-
dian policy without the undesirable political costs.
Id. at 485, quoting from GOV'T OF CANADA, PiuvY CouNsEL OFFICE, FORmN OWNERSHIP
AND THE STRUCTURES OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
STRucruRE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY 331 (1968) (also known as THE WATKINS REPORT).
58. See DEAN RuSK REPORT, supra note 1, at 34, 223.
59. Holmes, supra note 49, at 20.
60. See generally id. at 20-22.
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series of attempts to assert Mexican control over business and re-
sources.
6 1
To balance the conflicting forces, both Canada and Mexico have
passed laws to create institutions designed to encourage economic de-
velopment while protecting political independence. They include the
creation of PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos), the "Mexicanization" pro-
gram regulating foreign investments, the FIRA (Foreign Investment
Review Act of Canada), and Petro Canada, the Canadian national oil
company.
. PEMEX
Mexico began producing oil around the turn of the century,
financed by British and American money under concessions granted by
the Diaz government. After the Mexican revolution of 1910-1917, Arti-
cle 27 was added to the Mexican Constitution to protect against further
incursions. Reserving the rights to all subsoil resources to the Mexican
government,62 it is the foundation of all efforts to regulate foreign activ-
ity in the natural resources area. The Mexican government tried to en-
force the constitutional provision through the 1925 Petroleum Law
which attempted to limit foreign ownership in petroleum industries to
49%. When the foreign oil companies resisted, the Mexican govern-
ment did not continue pressing its case, showing that foreign interests
could still dominate the country, even after the revolution.63
After a period of quiet, the Cardenas government in 1935 began to
help labor unions organize. In 1936, oil field workers struck for higher
wages and benefits. The oil companies resisted and the issue was taken
to the Mexican Supreme Court. When the Court found in favor of the
workers, the oil companies refused to abide by the decision. President
Cardenas responded by nationalizing the oil companies on March 18,
1938, a date still celebrated in Mexico today.'
PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos) was formed in 1938. The United
States considered severing diplomatic relations as a result of nationali-
zation, as Britain had done, but decided instead to negotiate for a set-
tlement of claims. With trouble arising in Europe, the United States
61. See Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institution for Mexican Development: A Legis.
lat/ve History, 2 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173 (1978).
62. Epstein, Introduction to Recent Development in Mexican Law.- Politics of Modern
Nationalism, 4 DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & PoL'Y 2, 3 (1974).
63. See Gordon, supra note 61, at 181.
64. See L. MEYER, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE OIL CONTROVERSY, 1917-
1942, at 154-73 (2d ed. 1977).
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did not also want saber rattling along the southern border. After the
settlement was reached in 1942, Mexico declared war on Germany.
PEMEX serves as an example of a drastic political solution to a
long-festering problem. The crisis that spawned PEMEX, however,
was a basic question of sovereignty of Mexican courts over foreign
companies involved in a labor dispute, not a question of control over
investments. Thus, an extreme position whereby the oil companies re-
fused to accede to Mexican sovereignty was met by a more drastic
stance wherein Mexico nationalized the oil companies. Mexico was
willing to risk massive economic dislocations to retain its basic political
independence.
Today, there are no overt challenges to national sovereignty; in-
stead, subtler challenges take the form of questions over control or in-
vestment decisions. There is no longer any fear of sudden
nationalization.6" Today's mechanisms are more subtle and precisely
tuned to the foreign challenge posed. The "Mexicanization" laws are a
recent example of this approach.
2 Mexico's 1973 Investment Law
By the early 1970s, Mexico was ready to respond to foreign take-
over of some of the most profitable sectors of the Mexican economy."
In 1973, it passed a major law that codified earlier foreign investment
requirements, and extended restrictions to new areas.67 The law for-
malized the requirement that reserved certain basic industries to exclu-
sive control by the Mexican government, including petroleum, basic
petrochemicals, nuclear energy, telephones, electricity, railroads, and
segments of the mining industry. In other areas where private invest-
ment was allowed, it also reserved certain sectors exclusively to Mexi-
can investors, including banking, finance, insurance, radio and
television, transportation, and distribution of gas. 8
Also, the law imposed restrictions on foreign investment in other
sectors not reserved exclusively for Mexican nationals or the Mexican
government. Investment by foreigners generally may not exceed 49%
65. See Gordon, supra note 61, at 182.
66. In 1970, foreign investment controlled the following percentages of sectors of the
manufacturing industry: tobacco (84%), chemical (78%), metal products (68%), diverse man-
ufacturing products (60.5%), non-metallic mineral products (54%), and paper and paper
products (33%). Epstein, supra note 62, at 4, n. 54.
67. The 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment
[1973] D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 (Mexico) [hereinafter cited as Investment Law].
68. Id. art. 4.
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of the capital of any corporation and foreign management of the corpo-
ration may not exceed the percentage of its investment. Exceptions for
percentages higher than 49% may be obtained from the Foreign Invest-
ment Commission when such an investment is found to be "convenient
for the economy of the country."69 In addition, specific industries have
foreign ownership ceilings that are less than 49%, such as secondary
petrochemicals (40%), and automobile parts (40%).7°
Restrictions on foreign investment (especially the general limita-
tion to 49%) reflect a shift in the burden of proof in previously un-
restricted areas of economic activity. Before, the presumption was that
any amount of foreign investment was desired and no approval was
required, unless specifically restricted. Now, foreign investment above
the allowed percentages is presumed undesirable and the burden shifts
to the foreign investor to show why the proposed additional investment
would benefit Mexico.
71
On its face, the Investment Law does not apply retroactively, since
it allows existing firms with percentages of foreign investment higher
than 49% to continue under the same ownership. Such firms, however,
need to obtain permission to expand, something that is defined broadly
to include normal growth activities of a healthy business, including. cre-
ating new establishments, producing new products, or entering new
fields of endeavor. Such permission is usually granted only if the for-
eign-owned firm agrees to sell a majority of its holdings to Mexican
nationals.72 Therefore, adherence to the 49% rule generally applicable
to new investments becomes a de facto requirement even though it is
nominally not retroactive.73
The law also regulates acquisition of existing Mexican businesses
by foreigners. Prior permission by the Foreign Investment Commis-
sion is required if foreign investors seek to acquire more than 25% of
the equity or 49% of the fixed assets of a Mexican business entity.
7 4
Permits are also required for sale by one foreigner to another and Mex-
icans have a preferential right to purchase assets. No permit, however,
is generally required for a foreign investment of up to 49% in a new
company.7
5
69. Id. art. 5. Article 5(c) states that "the participation of foreign investment in the
administration of the business may not exceed its participation in the capital."
70. Id. art. 4.
71. Gordon, supra note 61, at 200.
72. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 66.
73. See Gordon, supra note 61, at 202.
74. Investment Law, supra note 67, art. 8.
75. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 65-66.
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The 1973 Investment Law codifies existing law, regulations, and
practices. 76 Prior to 1973, these requirements were confusing, contra-
dictory, and potentially very arbitrary. Most of the restrictions on in-
vestment in certain sectors of the economy have a long history. The
recent changes therefore do not pose a drastic alteration; instead, they
reflect an evolution of past practices.77 The principal new requirement
is the generalized restriction on foreign investment to no more than
49%. A principal new effect of the law is the reduction of arbitrary
executive power, since the process of reviewing investments is now
more standardized, centralized, and enforceable. 78
The major continuing result of the Investment Law is that it has
strengthened the use of the joint venture as a technique for growth in
Mexico. By spelling out and restricting participation of foreign money
in Mexico, a dual message is given-Mexico wants foreign involvement
in its economy, but wants it only on its own terms. The law represents
a sophisticated technique for development, especially in contrast with
other developing countries whose practices are more restrictive and less
finely tuned.79 In particular, joint ventures serve national economic de-
velopment without forcing the dislocations resulting from nationaliza-
tion of an industry. The creation of PEMEX decades ago, for example,
occurred in an industry where joint ventures were not successfully car-
ried out. Joint ventures and the Investment Law of 1973 are a less
disruptive alternative to nationalization. The Investment Law reflects
Mexico's ability to create a structure that balances the need for eco-
nomic development that is dependent to some degree on foreign in-
volvement while retaining and enhancing Mexican sovereigntyY°
3. Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act
Canada also enacted major legislation in 1973 to place restrictions
on foreign investment: the Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973
(FIRA).8' Canada, like Mexico, saw increasing economic interdepen-
dence with the United States as a first, undesired, step towards political
interdependence. American direct investment in Canada is extensive.
In 1967, 25% of all Canadian corporate assets were owned by foreign-
76. In contrast, other recently enacted laws represent an entirely new regulatory pro-
gram; for example, The 1972 Law on the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploita-
tion of Patents and Trademarks, [1972] D.O., Dec. 30, 1972 (Mexico).
77. See generally Gordon, supra note 61, at 179-98'
78. Id. at 201.
79. See id. at 203.
80. See id. at 179-80.
81. Foreign Investment Review Act, CAN. STAT. c. 46 (1973).
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controlled corporations, of which 80% were American and 10% were
British.82 By 1972, 34% of all of Canada's corporate assets were owned
by foreign-controlled firms.13 In light of this concentration of foreign
capital in Canadian industries, restrictions were placed on certain as-
pects of foreign investment in the late 1960s. The government placed
restrictions on foreign investment in railroads, airlines, and water
transportation. At least 50% Canadian ownership was required for cer-
tain mining, oil, and gas leases and mineral exploration grants. Cana-
dian laws also reserved insurance industry, loan, and trust companies
for Canadian control.8 4
The nation, however, needed a more general approach, instead of
ad hoc solutions. Herbert Gray, Minister without Portfolio, was
charged in 1970 with developing proposals. The Gray Report was is-
sued in 1972. It rejected the "key sector" approach of reserving certain
sectors solely for Canadian participation as being too inflexible. It also
rejected requiring fixed percentages of Canadian participation in cer-
tain industries as too expensive. Instead, the report favored creating a
new agency to review foreign takeovers of Canadian firms, to scrutinize
all new investments and unrelated expansions of foreign-controlled
companies already in Canada, and to screen licensing, management,
and joint-venture agreements between Canadian and foreign firms.
The overall purpose was to insure that new foreign investment entered
Canada only on terms favorable to Canada.85
In 1972, legislation based on the Gray Report (Bill C-102) was
introduced, but failed to pass because of attacks from both the left, who
thought it too weak, and the right, who thought it so nationalistic it
would discourage investment. At the 1972 elections, the voters indi-
cated stronger nationalistic sentiments. As a result, a stronger bill was
introduced in 1973 (Bill C-132) and it passed within months. The new
FIRA was part of a package that also included a proposed law restrict-
ing technology transfer and a law proposing Petro Canada.86
FIRA has two main features: 1) review of new foreign investment
in or takeovers of Canadian companies; and 2) review of expansion of
existing foreign businesses into unrelated areas of business activity.
But the bill is limited. Exempt from FIRA are existing operations and
82. Franck & Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign Investment Control Experiment:. The Law, the
Context and the Practice, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 86 (1975).
83. Id. at 143.
84. Id. at 93-96.
85. Id. at 102-03.
86. Id. at 106-09.
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expansions into areas of related business activity, which amounts to a
very substantial "grandfather clause", since it exempts three-quarters
of the growth by foreign businesses in Canada. In addition to these
limitations, FIRA does not actually prohibit foreign investment in Ca-
nadian business, nor does it actually require businesses to have Cana-
dian majority participation or even a fixed minimum of Canadian
ownership. However, FIRA's limited coverage does not leave gaping
holes. Since FIRA does not supersede "key sector" legislation, both
laws must be complied with. Because of key sector legislation in the
area of energy and nonrenewable resources, takeovers are virtually im-
possible.8 7
There is considerable administrative flexibility in applying two key
provisions of FIRA. These provisions are the standards for "related-
ness" (when reviewing new business investment to determine whether
the investment is subject to review); and the five flexible standards for
"'significant benefit" (which are the only basis under FIRA for approval
of any of the restricted foreign investment activities). Case by case
pragmatism is the approach used in applying those standards, rather
than prescriptive legalisms 8 Since less-developed Canadian provinces
are more willing to fight FIRA's restrictions on needed new economic
development, enlisting provincial government support for a project is
particularly helpful in getting it approved. 9
In practice, review of new investments or takeovers does not neces-
sarily mean rejection, as long as compliance with the principles of "sig-
nificant benefit" are shown. For example, by June 30, 1975, 22
takeover requests were rejected while 95 were approved.9° The new
Trudeau government, (which now includes Herbert Gray as Minister of
Industry, Trade and Commerce) however, has signalled that it intends
to clamp down on foreign investment by making greater use of the
powers of review in FIRA.91
FIRA, however, remains a relatively "laissez-faire" approach to
restricting foreign involvement in Canada's business. It assumes that if
87. Id. at 111-13.
88. Id. at 123-24.
89. Id. at 138-41.
90. Id. at 113.
91. See Trudeau Administration Takes Office, Seeks Afore Nationalistic Pathfor Canada,
Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1980, at 17, col. 1. The new government has already rejected three
investment proposals: Mobil's bid to purchase the Canadian interests of General Crude Oil
Co. (Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1980, at 7, col. I); Canadian General Electrie's proposed purchase
of Federal Pioneer Ltd. (an electrical equipment manufacturer); and AMOCO CYM Corp.'s
proposed purchased of Cyprus Anvil Mining Corp. (Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1980, at 22, col. 2).
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Canadians hold shares and management positions, the result will be a
more nationalistic and protective corporate attitude. FIRA does not
resort to government planning, direction, or ownership to resolve more
basic issues, such as reducing the "branch plant economy". Because of
its moderation, it has gained acceptance among Canada's own business
community and could even provide a model for the U.S. to use in re-
sponse to a potential influx of investment from petroleum producing
countries or areas with unstable governments. FIRA, therefore, serves
as a modest structure that attempts to balance the need for interdepen-
dent economic development with the need for political sovereignty.
4. Petro Canada
Canada, like Mexico, has also established a national energy com-
pany. The drive started because of the perception that foreign-domi-
nated oil companies would not be responsive to Canada's needs for
energy self-reliance. A national company was created to ensure those
needs were met.
Canada's approach is as different from Mexico's as are the circum-
stances that gave rise to them. Legislation creating the Canadian Na-
tional Petroleum Company (Petro Canada) passed the House of
Commons on July 10, 1975.92 It established an oil company designed
to act like a conventional private oil company, without regulatory au-
thority or special prerogatives. Petro Canada, unlike PEMEX, is not a
step towards nationalization of the oil industry and lacks the power to
expropriate private holdings. Instead, it is a complement to and com-
petitor with private companies.93
Between 1973 and 1975, the predictions for Canada's domestic en-
ergy reserves and its dependence on imports changed greatly. The
western provinces were self-sufficient, while the eastern provinces de-
92. Petro Canada Act, CAN. STAT. C. 61 (1975).
93. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATIONAL RESOURCES, U.S. SENATE, 95TtI CONG,, IST
SESS., PETRO CANADA: A NATIONAL OIL COMPANY IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT 23-26
(Comm. Print 1977) (Pub. No. 95-66) [hereinafter cited as PETRO CANADA]., Canada created
a national oil company to attain goals which were unattainable through regulatory tech-
niques. The government wanted experience operating an energy company in order to
achieve self-reliance through a better understanding of dealing with other governmental and
multinational oil companies, and to generate its own data for regulatory purposes. The
government also wanted to take the lead (and give a good example) in production in areas
with environmental fragility, less certain productivity, or high capital intensity, all of which
are avoided by private industry. In addition, the national government viewed Petro Canada
as a stimulus both to new oil investment and new technology and expertise. Whether this
goal would be achieved was hotly debated, but it has appeared to be the main benefit from
Petro Canada in its short, inconclusive history. .d. at 23-27, 35.
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pended on imports, primarily from Venezuela. After the 1974 energy
crisis (which hit Canada with less severity than other industrialized na-
tions), experts predicted that by 1985, Canada would depend on im-
ports for 45-50% of its consumption of oil. Estimated supplies of
Canada's gas plummeted from over 900 years in 1973 to 20 years in
1975. The costs of energy imports quadrupled from $941 million (Ca-
nadian) to $4 billion (Canadian).94
As a result of the 1974 energy crisis, Canada became aware of its
vulnerability because of its reliance on foreign supplies and also be-
came distrustful of foreign-dominated oil companies which had inaccu-
rately predicted energy reserves in Canada. The government
concluded that Canada faced a future of increasingly inadequate en-
ergy supplies, especially if it relied on private industry to make the
needed investments. The government, therefore, proposed creating
Petro Canada, with the objective of making Canada self-reliant in en-
ergy. It wanted to reduce dependence on foreign oil by 1985 to one-
third of Canada's annual consumption and to continue self-reliance in
natural gas until northern gas fields became commercially productive.
Self-reliance is designed to minimize risks arising from imports, not to
eliminate imports at any cost by pouring excessive amounts of capital
into developing new reserves."
Petro Canada is a vertically integrated company, with broad pow-
ers to enter into all areas of the petroleum business. It emphasizes sup-
ply (including exploration, production, and transportation), rather than
refining or marketing. It also has a mandate to promote conservation,
develop alternate energy sources, and serve as the international agents
of Canada in dealing with the growing number of national oil compa-
nies among both exporting and importing countries. Petro Canada also
has broad flexibility to expand into other energy areas so that it can
remain competitive with its private counterparts.96
The structure of Petro Canada reflects an attempt to tailor a na-
tional oil company to meet Canada's needs. Nationalization was too
drastic a remedy, and inaction was too tepid a response. Private capital
was still needed and sought, yet the need for a national "agent" in the
international marketplace of foreign-dominated (be they multinational
or national) oil companies was increasingly imperative. Petro Canada
is a blend of all these forces into a Canadian competitor in the energy
94. Id. at 6-7.
95. Id. at 8, 11, 13-14.
96. Id. at 23-26.
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field.97
D. Conclusion
Canada and Mexico have developed several institutional struc-
tures to balance the crosscurrents that govern the existing relations be-
tween the three countries of North America. The more weight put on
the economic interdependence between Canada, Mexico and the
United States, the greater the need for counterbalancing political struc-
tures that preserve political independence while assuring traditional
harmony.
In the past, when new economic pressures upset this balance, a
new political structure emerged. The examples above reflect this pat-
tern. In addition, when Mexico devalued the peso in 1976, the stability
that had allowed Mexico and the United States to trade since 1951
without a formal trade agreement was disrupted. The need to rational-
ize new economic relationships by creating new political structures was
shown by the signing in 1977 of the first new trade agreement between
the United States and Mexico since 1942. That agreement is important
not for the particular products it promotes, but for the elimination of
outdated trade barriers (like licensing) and replacing them with quotas
and tariffs.98
Today, there are substantial new pressures disrupting North
American trade. The energy crisis and political instability in energy-
producing nations has forced the United States to look for new energy
sources while it makes a long-term shift to an economy based on re-
newable resources. Mexico needs economic development to solve its
unemployment problems. As a developing country, it fears any bilat-
eral negotiations to achieve these ends. Bilateral negotiations among
developed countries necessarily exclude developing nations from agree-
ments of vital importance to a developing nation's welfare. Such nego-
tiations between a developing and a developed nation put pressure on
the developing country to grant reciprocal concessions that perpetuate
the existing disparity of global wealth.99 Nevertheless, satisfying Mex-
ico's needs means greater economic involvement with the highly devel-
oped, industrialized countries with which Mexico shares the North
American continent.
Canada also faces tremendous economic pressures. It needs to de-
97. See id. at 25-27, 35.
98. U.S.-Mexico Trade Agreement of 1977, supra note 44, at 454, 459.
99. Id. at 447.
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velop its resources in a manner that assures continued availability for
its industrialized economy and highly dispersed population. It seeks to
maintain its standard of living in the face of harsh elements, the threat
of internal fragmentation, and a continuing economic and cultural drift
towards the United States. In the past, Canada fought this drift in part
by using the British Empire and a European focus as a counterweight.
This counterweight was lost when Britain joined the European Eco-
nomic Community and Europe decided to focus increasingly on friends
and problems closer to home. Canada has sought another counter-
weight in Japan, but its total trade does not compare with other nations
in North America. Canada needs a new internationalistic arrange-
ment, based on shared economics, that can give it strength against the
United States to withstand assimilation.10
All three countries need a new political relationship that balances
the underlying economic strength of the North American continent
with the need for political sovereignty coupled with friendship. Such a
relationship would involve cooperation among all members in a man-
ner not possible even a few years ago. It would be built on the new
realities now emerging on a continental scale. The time is right for a
new forum-the North American Community.
III THE NORTH AMERI"CAN COMMUNITY." GOALS
A. Promoting Continental Cooperation
The economic interdependence of the North American countries
means that they must cooperate in achieving their individual economic
and political goals. This is so particularly in the field of international
trade. All three countries would benefit by increased cooperation in
resolving the trade issues which now divide them.
An increase in total trade would aid the economic well-being of all
three countries. The United States needs to improve its trade balance
to offset the distortions caused by the recent increases in world petro-
leum prices. 0 1 Canada, because of its small population, relies heavily
on increasing its export capacity to fuel its economic growth.10 2 Mexico
100. Holmes, supra note 49, at 21-22.
101. The United States, in 1977, had a $29 billion trade deficit. This deficit almost
equals the value of the petroleum imported by the U.S. (S34 billion). See U.S. Bi-
PORTS/WORLD AREAs; supra note 14, at 1, 6; U.S. EXPORTs/WoRLD AREAS, supra note 14,
at 1.
102. Neil Airrie, economic advisor to the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, stated:
"[one factor] leading to consideration, [sic] of alternative policy options has been the group-
ing in recent years of countries into trading blocs such that Canada now stands virtually
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needs to increase its foreign trade to break its vicious unemployment
cycle. 10 3 Each country, as demonstrated by existing trade figures, is a
logical source of increased trade for the other two.0 4
The number of products these countries trade should also be ex-
panded. Existing trade is limited to relatively few commodities. 05 An
expansion of the number of commodities would stimulate growth in all
three countries and would prevent market fluctuations in one area from
disrupting the trade relationships among the countries.
Increased trade, although it is almost an axiomatic goal, will not
be easy to accomplish. It will require a change in the trade policies of
the three countries. In the past, Canada, Mexico, and the United States
have pursued divergent, in some cases conflicting, trade policies. The
United States has generally supported free trade, a policy which reflects
its economic power. The United States does retain some tariff and non-
tariff barriers to free trade, however, and it is these barriers which cause
friction with Canada and Mexico."°6 Canada, concerned about serving
alone among the industrialized countries in the world in not having free access to a market
of 200 million people." Hearings I, supra note I, at 71.
103. Estimates of the Mexican unemployment or under employment rate range as high
as 40% with 700,000 more workers entering the labor force each year. Id. at 86. Without
increased trade, the unemployment cycle becomes self-perpetuating. Unemployment leads
to economic stagnation which leads to more unemployment. More trade, however, breaks
the cycle. Increased exports mean more jobs and more money. Mexico can use this money
to purchase the capital goods needed for further economic expansion.
104. Canada and Mexico, in particular, should expand their trading relationship. Mcx-
ico trades less with Canada than it does with the United States, West Germany, Japan, and
Brazil. Canada still retains a strong European orientation, trading more with the United
Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and even tiny Belgium-Luxem-
bourg than it does with Mexico. Some movement in the direction of greater Canadian and
Mexican trade can be discerned. Barrios Gomez, Mexican Ambassador to Canada, recently
told the Canadian Club of Toronto that the amount of existing trade was "ridiculous" and
that "it should be six times what it is now." He also said that vlexico is considering the
purchase of a Canadian nuclear reactor and is also interested in Canadian developments in
telecommunications, agriculture, uranium mining and exploration, transportation and food
packaging. Mexican Envoy Calls For Links With Canada, Toronto Globe and Mail, Dec. 11,
1979, § B, at 16, col. 1.
105. For example, six commodities (paper and paperboard, railway vehicles, iron and
steel, milk and cream, crude minerals, and non-electric power machinery) account for 70%
of all Canadian exports to Mexico U.N. CANADA STATISTICS, supra note 14, at 53, 55, 67,79,
84, 91, 101. Automotive products account for almost 30% of Canadian-American trade. See,
e.g., U.S. IMPORTS/WORLD AREAS, supra note 14; U.S. EXPORTS/WORLD AREAS, supra
note 14.
106. The United States acknowledges these barriers but denies that they are the source of
Mexico's problems. Alan Wolff, Deputy Special Representative for trade negotiations,
stated:
Mexico, on the other hand, views the United States as essentially protectionist
through tariff and nontariff barriers on quite a number of goods that Mexico pro.
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its small population, developing cohesive national ties, and meeting the
economic threat of the United States, has a more restrictive trade pol-
icy. 10 7 Mexico is the most protectionist of the three. Mexico refused to
join GATT and apparently intends to rely on its petroleum to subsidize
its domestic industry. 10
These trade policies are so divergent that it is unlikely that they
can be harmonized, particularly in the near future. The policies reflect
the differences in economic strength of the three countries and, of equal
importance, the perceived national interests of each. Nevertheless,
more free trade is in the best interests of the three. It is best ap-
proached on a sector-by-sector basis. Two examples will be discussed
here--one which has been resolved, the Auto Pact, and one which is
under discussion, Mexican railcars.
The Canadian-American Automobile Pact was signed in 1965 to
promote freer trade in motor vehicles and parts between the two coun-
tries.10 9 The automobile industry had been a perfect example of what
Canada considered its "branch plant" economy. Canada supplied the
parts and the raw materials but the cars were assembled and shipped
from the United States. In reaction to this situation, Canada began to
take protectionist steps, e.g., increasing its tariffs, and providing incen-
tives to Canadian manufactures in order to promote its domestic econ-
omy. This action caused friction in Canada's relations with the United
States. The friction was dealt with by negotiations which led to the
signing of the Pact.
duces. We would say, while there is some truth in the fact that the tariff and
nontariff barriers-in the United States impact on Mexican products, that Mexico
suffers more fundamentally, not from our barriers, but from a lack of competitive-
ness with Mexican exports.
Hearings I, supra note 1, at 6-7.
107. See id. at 70-71 (the statement of Neil Currie, Economic Advisor to the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce). On the other hand, Canada-as a member of GATT-does seek
to liberalize trade in this multilateral forum. One of Canada's principal concerns is that
Canada represents a "branch plant" economy for the United States: "Canada has an indus-
trial structure which is characterized by many small secondary manufacturing units, oflen
truncated branch plants, producing too large a range of goods with too short production
runs." .d. at 71.
Canada, therefore, faces a dilemma. It needs freer trade to maintain its standard of
living. On the other hand, freer trade means further specialization with the risk of further
promoting the branch plant economy.
108. Mexico Boosts Target for Oil Production and Decides Against GAT7Tifembershp,
Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1980, at 27, coL 1. Mexico views high tariff barriers as necessary for the
development of strong domestic industry. The United States views the matter differently.
"In the case of Mexico, there is a good deal of protectionist sentiment that masquerades as a
desire to develop." Hearings I, supra note 1, at 6.
109. AuToMoTrVE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
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The Pact has three general goals:
(1) the creation of a broader market for automotive products within
which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale produc-
tion can be achieved;
(2) the liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive
trade in respect to tariff barriers and other factors tending to
impede it, with a view to enabling the industries of both coun-
tries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the ex-
panding total market of the two countries; and
(3) the development of conditions in which market forces may op-
erate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of invest-
ment, production, and trade."
0
The Pact essentially eliminated all trade barriers between the two
countries."' Canadian manufacturers may now export automobiles to
the United States duty-free. Canadian parts and accessories are also
duty-free, provided that they are delivered to American manufactur-
ers." 2 American exports are duty-free to Canadian manufacturers, al-
though individual Canadians must still pay a 15% duty."
13
The Pact has benefited both countries. As noted previously, auto-
motive products account for almost 30% of the total trade between the
countries. The Pact gives the United States a $1 billion trade surplus
with Canada in auto products."' Canadian auto and truck sales, be-
tween 1965 and 1976, have increased 55% and its production has in-
creased 94%.' 1' Thus, even though disagreements still arise,"16 there
110. Id. at 2-3.
111. Bilateral free trade, such as the Auto Pact, could violate both countries' obligations
under GATT. Canada, because it extended duty-free treatment on a most favored nation
basis to all manufacturers who had production facilities in Canada, did not seek a GATT
waiver. The United States, apparently fearful of Japanese and German imports, only
granted duty-free treatment to Canada. A GATT waiver, therefore, was necessary. See Id,
at 3-5.
112. Id. at 4-6.
113. Id. at 4. This provision, although limiting free trade, was included as a provisional
protection for Canadian manufacturers. Since the Canadian industry was smaller and,
therefore, less efficient, the limitation was designed to give Canadian manufacturers time to
"adjust to the competitive pressures within the larger North American Automotive Industry
market." Id.
114. See id. at 1.
115. See Id. at 29-30 (based on 1976 statistics).
116. Much of the disagreement arises from the American side. Critics of the Pact argue
that it does not create free trade since Canadian consumers must still pay a 15% duty. See
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. RE. No. 1298, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 235 (1974). Proponents argue that the American problems stem from imports from




have been no major efforts to repeal the Pact or to diminish its free
trade provisions.
The Automobile Pact is a model for increased continental cooper-
ation. Free trade in auto products is almost a necessity, considering the
importance of the auto industry to both countries. The only alternative
to free trade is more protectionism, which in the long run hurts both
countries. Each would lose access to its most important export market.
This loss would injure the economies of both. Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that the Pact should be extended to include Mexico. Mexico
trades automotive products with the United States and Canada. Most
of the trade, however, is limited to parts. Free trade with Mexico
would create a truly North American market for automotive products.
At the very least, the Auto Pact should be used as the basis for other
sectoral free-trade agreements. One example is railcars.
All three countries produce and export railway cars, including lo-
comotives and freight cars. 17 Production is extremely cyclical, de-
pending as it does oft the health of other industries, such as autos and
agriculture."' Although the size of the industry is small in comparison
to others, it has become an irritant in the relations between the North
American countries.
The United States has a shortage of railway cars, particularly
freight cars." 9 Mexico could help to eliminate this shortage because of
117. Railway Vehicles and Parts
Exports to: U.S. Canada Mexico
Canada S34,831,000 s - S
Mexico 32,306,000 32,152,000
U.S. - 13,706,000 4,591,000
Imports from:
Canada $13,706,000 S - S32,152,000
Mexico 4,591,000
U.S. - 34,831,000 32,306,000
Statistics compiled by the authors from U.S. EXPORTS/WoRLD AREAS, supra note 14, at 172,
183; U.S. IMPORTS/WoRLD AREAS, supra note 14, at 125, 134; U.N. CANADA STATISTICS,
supra note 14, at 44-45.
118. See Railroads Canceling Freight Car Orders, Postponing Delivenrier Because ofSlump,
Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1980, at 14, col 2.
119. The United States produces almost 80,000 freight cars a year and has outstanding
orders for about 125,000. Manufacturers expect delays of 18 months in filling these orders.
See Railcar Tariffs-The Latest US.-Mexico Trade Dispute, NATIONAL JOURNAl, SepL
15, 1979, at 1529. The shortage is expected to continue for some time because production is
less than demand and because of the number of cars which will be retired every year (over
41,000 in 1978). See Suspension of Du on Freight Cars: Hearing on HA,1 3016 before the
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its capacity to produce and to export an additional 2,000 freight cars
per year.1 20 It cannot do so, however, because of the mechanical opera-
tion of American tariff laws.
The United States imposes an 18% duty on all imported freight
cars.12' Canadian manufacturers are subject to the duty but, because of
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), Mexican manufacturers
generally are not. The GSP provides for duty-free entry of goods from
developing countries under certain circumstances. 22 An article loses
its GSP status if the imports exceed the "competitive need ceiling," that
is, if one country accounts for more than 50% of the imports in a given
year. 123 In 1977, Mexican exports of railway vehicles exceeded the ceil-
ing and, therefore, lost their GSP status, becoming subject to an 18%
duty.
The arbitrary enforcement of the American tariff laws simply did
not make sense in this case. Mexican railcars did not pose a threat to
U.S. manufacturers since Mexico could only produce a limited number
of cars per year. Moreover, because most Mexican cars used American
components, this country benefited from increased trade. 124 The U.S.
clearly needed the freight cars. The imposition of a tariff did not aid
American manufactures since they could not meet the demand with or
without tariffs. The only effect was to penalize American users and
Mexican manufacturers. 25 This result was counter-productive to gen-
eral trade policy and, in particular, trade policy with Mexico. Mexico
has not imposed duties on American locomotives, even though Mexico
imported such vehicles last year. 2 6 Mexico could easily have re-
sponded to American policy with tariffs of its own. This result would
ultimately have hurt both countries.
Railcars, then, illustrate why an agreement like the Auto-Pact
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34
(September 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Freight Car Hearings].
120. Freight Car Hearings, supra note 119, at 69.
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976).
122. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1976).
123. See 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(B) (1976). GSP status is also lost when the value of the
goods exported to the United States in a ratio to $25 million exceeds the ratio between the
United States GNP of one year and 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(A) (1976). See text accom-
panying notes 106-108 supra.
124. Freight Car Hearings, supra note 119, at 70.
125. Legal counsel for an American grain operator testified that the duty added $1 mil-
lion to the industry's costs, all of which would be passed on to the consumer. Id. at 28
(statement of Frederick S. Cassman).
126. Id. at 57.
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would be useful.'2 7 Freer trade would benefit both countries by pro-
moting efficiency, creating protections against cyclical declines in de-
mand, and by eliminating an irritant in relations between Mexico and
the United States.
Freer trade is only one benefit of increased continental coopera-
tion. Many other areas exist in which the national interests of Canada,
the United States, and Mexico would be served by more cooperation.
This is so particularly in the fields of research, technology transfer, and
joint projects.
Mexico and the United States, for example, both have an interest
in certain agricultural and energy projects. Both countries have done
research on what crops will grow on marginal lands. Mexico especially
has analyzed the techniques for growing jojoba, a bean with an oil
base, similar to whale oil, and guayule, one with a latex base. Joint
development of these crops would benefit both countries by allowing
them to use otherwise marginal agricultural land and by permitting
them to decrease imports of oil-derived products. 28
Similarly, Mexico and the United States would benefit by in-
127. Freight cars also perfectly illustrate the problems in promoting free trade. The in-
temal politics of the United States make totally free trade virtually impossible. A bill, H.R.
3046, was introduced in 1979 to suspend the duties for two years. Business and agricultural
interests supported the bill because they needed the railcars. Labor opposed it because of
the fear that it would eliminate American jobs. Congressman Vanik summarized the prob-
lem:
Mr. Vanik. I just want to translate to you one of the problems that I get on the
floor with legislation of this type. There is still another economic issue that is in-
volved. We have in the railroad cars a growth industry and the conversion of the
shipbuilding plants in Mississippi. That is a very good thing because it takes up
probably the slack of defense production falling off, and that is probably wise and
economically sound. But we have a regional conflict.
Here you have these jobs created down there, and then I have a legislative
problem on the floor in which the protest may come from all over the older sec-
tions, particularly the North, where you have obsolete industries or many older
industries that are fighting for survival, and that are not enjoying the advantage of
the shift.
You have a very deep critical regional problem as we in the more mature
northern part of the country are facing a problem of more plant obsolesence and
probably higher cost labor. Id. at 91.
128. See Hearings II, supra note 1, at 56. Joint research does not always mean American
research. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Pickering noted:
We have an awful lot of interest in this country in a source of latex, which is not
dependent upon foreign imports and so Mexican work in guayule, which has got-
ten out ahead of ours in many areas, particularly in the cultivation and processing
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creased sharing of technical information. Mexico needs new technol-
ogy to develop its economic base fully. The United States has much of
that technology, the export of which would benefit both countries
1 29
One example is solar energy. Mexico is interested in solar energy for
use in its rural areas, as an alternative to the development of expensive
new power plants and transmission lines. 130 The United States has
some of that technology and, to the extent the technology has not been
developed, could cooperate with Mexico. Both countries need solar en-
ergy to lessen their dependence on petroleum. Both would benefit by
increased cooperation in this area.
Another area for increased continental cooperation lies in the de-
velopment of joint projects. Because of their geographical proximity,
these countries can cooperate in the construction of transportation
lines, especially energy transportation. In the past, however, they have
failed to do so because of excessive caution in protecting their per-
ceived national interests. The Alaska Oil Pipeline is a good example.
The pipeline controversy arose as the governments attempted to
determine how to move Alaskan oil to the "Northern Tier" states
(Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Idaho, and Washington). Be-
cause there was no existing pipeline, the oil was shipped through the
Panama Canal to the Gulf Coast states, such as Texas. This transpor-
tation route was (and still is) extremely expensive; efforts began to de-
termine a more efficient route.
Basically, three different routes were under consideration.131 The
Northern tier pipeline would have come from the Puget Sound in the
State of Washington to Minnesota. The Alaskan oil would have been
shipped by tanker from Valdez to Washington under this proposal.
The Northwest-Foothill pipeline would have run from Fairbanks,
where it would have connected with the existing Prudhoe Bay-Valdez
pipeline, to Edmonton, where it would connect with existing lines to
the Northern Tier states. 132 The last alternative was the Trans Moun-
129. A recent Congressional report identified several areas as being particularly appro.
priate: nuclear, hydroelectric and solar energy, aviation and space, computers, telecommu-
nications, transportation and heavy equipment. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATION AND
OVERSIGHT & SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE HousE
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., U.S./MExICO RELATIONS
AND POTENTIALS REGARDING ENERGY, IMMIGRATION, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (Comm. Print 1979) at 13.
130. See Hearings II, supra note 1, at 56.
131. See Wilson, Decision Point Nearfor U.S. West-East Oil PF6elhne, OIL & GAS J.,
October 1, 1979, at 23.
132. This proposal originally called for tanker shipments to Skagway, in northwestern
Canada and construction of a pipeline to Edmonton. d. at 24.
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tain Pipeline which would also have run from Puget Sound. Instead of
moving across the Northern Tier states, however, this pipeline would
have run to Edmonton where it would connect with the existing pipe-
lines. 
13 3
The pipeline, whichever proposal was approved, clearly would
have affected both Canada and the United States and therefore de-
manded cooperation between the two governments. The decisionmak-
ing process for the pipeline was a complicated one. Private companies
who would build the pipeline required a number of governmental ap-
provals from Canada and the United States before they could begin
construction. Rather than working together, the governments of Ca-
nada and the United States acted independently, although they did
seek the other's views.
The American approach rested on the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978.134 The Act gave the President the power to ap-
prove one or more of the proposals for construction. The President's
decision did not mean that the approved pipeline would be built. That
billion-dollar decision was left to the private sector and depended on
the available financing. Presidential approval, however, did speed the
regulatory review of the project, considered almost a prerequisite on a
project of this kind.' 35 In sum, the Act provided a detailed and com-
prehensive procedure for the making of the decision.'
36
133. A fourth alternative, the Kitimat Pipeline, was rejected by the Canadian govern-
ment for environmental reasons. The government was concerned that the proposal, which
called for considerable tanker traffic on Canada's west coast, severely threatened the envi-
ronment. See Id.
134. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2012 (Supp. 11 1978).
135. Some of the benefits of presidential approval included: waiver of any law "which,
in the national interest, as determined by the President, should be waived in whole or in part
to facilitate construction or operation of any such system" (43 U.S.C. § 2008(a) (Supp. II
1978)); accelerated procedures for issuance of permits and the granting of right-of-ways over
federal land (43 U.S.C. § 2009 (Supp. 111978)); and a requirement that judicial challenges
be filed within 60 days (43 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (Supp. 111978)).
136. The Secretary of the Interior was directed to collect the views of federal agencies
concerning the different proposals. The Secretary was then to compile the views of the
agency heads, provide them to state officials for comment, and then provide them to the
public for comment. Then he was to forward the recommendations, with the comments, to
the President. 43 U.S.C. § 2005 (Supp. II 1978). The president then had at least 45 days to
make his decision. The Act also listed the factors which the President must consider in
making the decision. Those factors include findings of:
a) environmental impacts of the proposed systems;
b) the amount of crude oil available to the northern tier states and the
projected demand under each system;
c) transportation costs and delivered prices for the oil;
d) construction schedules;
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Despite all of the safeguards provided in the Act, one is visibly
absent-prior consultation with the Canadian government. This omis-
sion is significant because it shows that the United States intended to
make its decision independently of, and possibly in conflict with, Cana-
dian policy. This is, in fact, what happened.' 37
Citing four reasons, President Carter endorsed the Northern Tier
proposal:
A) The Northern Tier proposal provides the greatest energy trans-
portation flexibility since it can receive oil from many sources
and has the largest volume capacity;
B) The location of the line entirely within the U.S. provides a na-
tional security advantage;
C) The line could be operational sooner;
D) The line would provide employment for thousands of Ameri-
cans as well as spurring business opportunities and enhancing
local tax bases.
138
It can be argued that none of these factors is compelling and that
the President should have adopted the Canadian proposal or, at the
very least, certified all three pipelines for accelerated review. 39 While
e) feasibility of financing each system;
f) capital and operating costs of each system;
g) net national economic costs and benefits of each system;
h) compliance with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act;
i) the effect of each system on international relations, including the status and
time schedule for any necessary Canadian approvals and plans;
j) impact on competition of each system;
k) degrees of safety and efficiency of design and operation of each system;
1) potential for interruption of deliveries of crude oil from the west coast
under each system;
m) capacity and cost of expanding the system to transport more crude oil;
n) national security considerations under each system;
o) relationship of each system to national energy policy;
p) other factors as the President deems appropriate.
43 U.S.C. § 2007 (Supp. 11 1978).
137. The fact that prior consultation was not required does not mean that such discussion
did not occur. The Canadian government made clear from the beginning that it preferred
the Northwest Foothills pipeline. White House Statement on the President's Approval of
the Pipeline System, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 99-101 (January 17, 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COMPILATION]. However, the President was not required to consider, much less
yield to, Canadian views.
138. Id. at 100. Carter referred to the Trans Mountain line as the second best alternative
if the Northern Tier system was unable to secure adequate financing within six months. Id.
at 99.
139. The Act allows the President to do so. See 43 U.S.C. § 2007(a)(1) (Supp. 111978),
The effect of certifying all three would have been to allow the private sector to determine
which was the best alternative.
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the Northern Tier pipeline would have the greatest capacity of the
three,"4 it is not clear that it will ever be needed. Moreover, in terms of
flexibility of source (e.g., ability to handle oil from California, Alaska,
or foreign sources), there is no difference between the Trans Mountain
and Northern Tier pipelines. Both begin in Washington State. Both
would be available for transporting oil from all three areas.
The President also referred to the value to national security of
having the pipeline totally within the United States. The Department
of Defense, however, recommended the Northwest Foothills line pre-
sumably because of the dangers to tanker traffic along the west coast.
14
The State Department advised that concern for Canadian-American
relations need not be a factor in the President's decision. 4 The Presi-
dent also mentioned that the line could be operational sooner. 43 The
Northern Tier lines would be constructed within two years of the issu-
ance of permits. The Northwest Foothills proposal, however, could
have been completed by 1982.'44 Thus, time was not a compelling fac-
tor.
The final, but probably most important, factor is economics. The
President found that the Northern Tier proposal would aid American
business. This factor is important, considering the S1.23 billion price
tag for the project. 145 It is not an imperative consideration, however,
since American firms are also involved in the other proposals. 46 Fur-
thermore, American interests could be promoted even with the North-
west Foothills line through negotiated concessions with the Canadian
government. For example, the President could have approved the
Northwest Foothills or Trans Mountain lines in exchange for a Cana-
140. The Northern Tier pipeline would have a maximum capacity of 933,000 bar-
rels/day, compared with Northwest Foothills' proposed capacity of 750,000 barrels/day, and
Trans Mountain's proposed capacity of 630,000 barrels/day. Wilson, supra note 13 1, at 23-
25.
141. Id. at 27.
142. The Department stated that: "Given the protection to U.S. interests represented by
the Transit Pipeline Treaty and the tradition of U.S.-Canadian cooperation in energy trans-
portation projects, the President can approach his decision concerning an oil delivery system
on an essentially 'neutral' basis as between route options in either country." Id.
143. West-to-East Crude Oil Transportation System: White House Statement on the
President's Approval of the Pipe Line System, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 100 (Jan.
21, 1980).
144. Wilson, supra note 131, at 25.
145. Id. at 23.
146. Alaska International Industries Company is a partner in the Northwest Foothills
line. Several American oil companies, including Atlantic Richfield Co., Gulf Oil Co., and
Standard Oil Co. of California, own large blocks of stock in the parent company of Trans
Mountain. Id. at 25.
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dian agreement to use a percentage of American goods, labor, or capi-
tal. The ultimate arrangement would have been beneficial to both
countries while at the same time accomplishing this true goal-namely,
the construction of an efficient, environmentally sound, militarily se-
cure oil pipeline.
As significant as the factors referred to by the President are the
factors he failed to mention. The President did not discuss the environ-
mental hazards of increased tanker traffic in Puget Sound.'47 The Pres-
ident also did not discuss operating costs. It has been estimated that
the transportation costs for Northern Tier oil will fall between $2.15-
3.06 a barrel. Trans Mountain oil, on the other hand, can be shipped
for between $1.74-1.98 a barrel.
4 1
In summary, the President's decision is perplexing. He chose the
alternative which cost more to construct than some other options,
149
which posed more environmental hazards, 50 was less secure from a
military point of view,' 5' and which had higher operating costs.'52 The
Northern Tier proposal does provide flexibility but no more flexibility
than the Trans Mountain proposal. Domestic economic factors appear
to have been decisive in Carter's decision, but even this issue might
easily have been resolved through negotiations with the Canadian gov-
ernment.
The pipeline controversy is a perfect illustration of the need for
and benefits of increased continental cooperation. The President, by
considering Canadian views from the beginning, could have negotiated
a beneficial, cooperative agreement for the construction of the pipeline.
The good will from such an agreement would undoubtedly have spilled
over into other areas of relations between the two countries. This is not
to say that the President necessarily should have chosen one of the
other proposals. He could, however, have certified all three and then
let the market determine which should be built. By choosing the
Northern Tier line to the exclusion of the Trans Mountain and North-
147. Congress was concerned with this specific problem. H.R. REP. No. 95-1750, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 108, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 7797, 7842, The
EPA spoke favorably of the Northwest Foothills line for the same reason: "This (all land)
system would avoid the navigational and oil spill risks associated with the
tanker/port/pipeline systems offered by all four applicants." Wilson, supra note 131, at 26.
148. Wilson, supra note 131, at 26.
149. Trans Mountain: $525 million; Northern Tier: $1.23 billion; Northwest Foothills:
$1.56 billion. Id. at 23-24.
150. See id. at 26.
151. See id. at 27.
152. Id. at 26.
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west Foothills proposals, the President adopted a short-sighted view of
the national interest.
B. Comprehensive, Trilateral Problem-Solving
The second major goal of the North American Community should
be the encouragement of comprehensive, trilateral problem-solving. In
the past, Canada, the United States, and Mexico have dealt with each
other on a bilateral, issue by issue, basis. This approach is inadequate
for a number of reasons. Bilateral negotiations prohibit the third coun-
try from asserting its interest in or contributing to the solution of the
problems between the other two. Issue-by-issue negotiations do not
necessarily result in solutions which are in the general national interest
of either country. Comprehensive, trilateral negotiations are more
likely to solve such problems. The natural gas negotiations between
the United States and Mexico illustrate the problems of the current ap-
proach, as well as the potential benefits of a new policy.
The natural gas controversy began in 1977 during negotiations be-
tween the United States and Mexico. Mexico has large natural gas
reserves."5 3 Exporting to the United States is one of the most efficient
ways for Mexico to dispose of the gas.' 54 Mexico, in early 1977, en-
tered into negotiations with a consortium 55 of American firms for the
sale of natural gas. A "Memorandum of Intentions" was signed on
August 3, 1977, under the terms of which Mexico agreed to supply an
initial delivery of 50 million cubic feet/day, growing to 2 billion cubic
feet/day by 1979.156 The price was pegged to No. 2 fuel oil delivered to
New York harbor, making the price of initial shipments approximately
$2.60 per million cubic feet (mcf). The term was 6 years, renewable for
an additional six years. 117
This agreement had to be approved by the United States govern-
ment, leading to a fiasco in United States-Mexican relations. The
153. WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 3, at 49; Grayson, spra note 29, at 6.
154. Mexico, of course, has other less attractive options. To retain the gas for domestic
consumption, it would have to re-tool its industry. It could reinject the gas into the wells or
"flare" it, but both these options are wasteful and expensive. Exports to Europe and Japan
are too expensive because of the cost of building LNG facilities. Grayson, supra note 29, at
6-8.
155. The following firms, with the percentage of gasoline each agreed to take, were mem-
bers of the consortium: Tenneco InterAmerican, Inc. (37.5%); Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp. (27.5%); El Paso Natural Gas Co. (15%); Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. (10%);
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American government was mainly concerned about the pricing provi-
sions of the agreement. The domestic price of natural gas was
$1.75/mcf at the time. The Canadian price was $2.16/mcf. The gov-
ernment was fearful that approval of the agreement would lead Canada
to demand parity with the Mexican price.158 The United States also
assumed that Mexico would ultimately come to terms because they be-
lieved that Mexico had no alternatives to selling the gas in the United
States.
Energy Secretary Schlesinger rejected the agreement at a meeting
with the head of PEMEX and Mexico's foreign minister in a manner
termed "abrupt and arrogant" by the Mexican officials.' 59 Mexico ter-
minated negotiations and cancelled the agreement. After being in-
sulted by the United States, Mexico turned the tables. It cancelled a
$33 million contract with United States Steel Corporation for pipe to
be used in constructing the pipeline.' 60 Rumors grew in Mexico City
that Mexico would supply oil to Cuba in exchange for Russian ship-
ments to Spain, a growing importer of crude.161 Mexican officials,
rather than believing that Mexico must sell to the United States, began
talking about the fact that the United States must buy from Mexico.
62
The United States and Mexico finally came to terms in September
1979. A new agreement was negotiated under which the United States
would buy 300 mcf/day, down from 2 billion under the original con-
tract, at an initial price of $3.63/mcf, up from the original $2.60 price.
Mexican imports began in January 1980.163
Secretary Schlesinger's decision seems short-sighted in retrospect.
The United States ended up paying more for and getting less Mexican
gas. Moreover, the United States failed to avoid getting whipsawed by
Canada and Mexico, the ostensible reason for its rejection of the origi-
nal deal. In February 1980, Canada increased it price to $4.47 per
million B.T.U.'s (about 1000 cubic feet of gas).' 64 Five days later Mex-
158. Senator Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.) introduced a resolution warning that the
purchase at Mexico's price "could set a dangerous precedent for prices of other U.S. energy
imports." See id. at 14-15. Some people also questioned the amount of bargaining that the
consortium did. Id. at 10.
159. Id. at 17. Schlesinger specifically objected to the provision linking the price to No, 2
Fuel Oil. Id.
160. Id. at 19. There was doubt as to whether the contract could have been completed
from the outset.
161. Id. at 20.
162. Id. at 18.
163. 4greement with Mexico on Natural Gas, DEP'T. STATE BULL. 58, 58-59 (1979).
164. The United States after objecting, finally accepted the increase in exchange for a
Canadian promise to maintain that price until July 1. Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1980, at 8, col. 2.
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ico and the United States announced that the price of Mexican gas
would rise 23% to the Canadian price of $4.47. 165
The natural gas negotiations illustrate the inadequacy of bilateral
negotiations as well as the benefits which can be derived through com-
prehensive, trilateral problem-solving. The value of trilateral negotia-
tions are almost self-evident. Secretary Schlesinger rejected the deal, in
part, because he feared that Canada would demand price parity. That,
of course, is precisely what happened. Moreover, the rejection was ex-
pensive for the United States because, by the time it renegotiated the
Canadian and Mexican prices in March 1980, it ultimately paid a
higher price than it would have under the original agreements. This
diplomatic and economic blunder might have been avoided had Ca-
nada been a party to the original negotiations.
Canada, had it been involved in the negotiations, could have made
its position known. Canada could have attempted to force down the
price of Mexican gas by threatening to increase its exports. Alterna-
tively, it could have sided with Mexico and demanded that both coun-
tries be paid the same price. Still another possibility is that the nations
could have agreed on a common pricing formula, one which took into
account different recovery and transportation costs as well as the length
of the contract. In any case, all three countries could have been in-
volved in the same set of negotiations. Canada and Mexico could have
asserted their joint and individual interests in relation to the United
States. Trilateral negotiations would also have lessened the possibility
that the United States would be whipsawed by Canada and Mexico.
The natural gas negotiations also illustrate the problem of issue-
by-issue negotiations. Issue-by-issue negotiations can lead to solutions
which reflect the bureaucratic bias of the negotiators. 16 In the natural
gas negotiations Secretary Schlesinger rejected the deal because he, as
Secretary of Energy, only had the authority to review the proposed
price of the natural gas. His decision was not based on the trade impli-
165. Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1980, at 6, col 2. This article chides the Administration for
abandoning the September 1979 agreement: "The White House had hailed that agreement
as a 'breakthrough', saying it would ensure more favorable prices than normal commercial
dealings, and would assure that Canada and Mexico wouldn't be tempted to raise prices in a
leapfrog arrangement." The author also noted that the price rise under the original deal,
pegged to the price of crude oil, would not have been as dramatic as the price increase
agreed to by Mexico and the United States. Id.
166. This phenomenon, known as issue-area isolation, in essence means that: "Officials
in separate agencies find it virtually impossible, given their vested interests, to give up some-
thing dear to them so that another agency can obtain something dear to it." Holsti & Levy,
supra note 9, at 292.
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cations, as it would have been if made by the Special Trade Represen-
tative, nor was it based on the diplomatic consequences, as it would
have been if made by the Secretary of State. 67 If., on the other hand,
the ultimate decision had been made by someone who could take into
account all of the factors, the decision would more likely have been in
the general interest of each country.
68
The other problem with issue-by-issue negotiations is the inability
to link issues or solutions. These negotiations were concerned exclu-
sively with the price at which the United States would purchase the
Mexican natural gas and how much gas would be supplied. This ap-
proach required that both countries be satisfied with the cash price for
the gas. The issues were narrowed to such a degree as to create unwar-
ranted friction in United States-Mexican relations. Had the issues been
broadened, the countries could have arrived at a more amicable solu-
tion. A frequently cited example, linkage of natural gas price to immi-
gration policy, 16 9 has already been rejected by Mexico. That is not to
say that linkage is impossible. For example, the United States could
have accepted Mexico's price, but offered to pay partly in cash and
partly in industrial equipment or development aid. Under this propo-
sal, the costs and benefits of the deal would have been spread through-
out the American economy and would not have been limited to the
consortium of oil and gas companies. Mexico would also have bene-
fited by this approach because of its need for industrial equipment and
machinery.
C. Preservation of Sovereignty and Independence
The third major goal of the North American Community should
be the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of all three
countries. This goal is critical to the success of the community because,
without it, such an organization simply will not come into being. All
three countries insist on the preservation of their right to act indepen-
167. The trade representative would have viewed the deal in relation to the total trade
between the countries. The Secretary of State might also have looked at the strategic conse-
quences if the United States failed to obtain a new supply of natural gas.
168. A good example of issue-area isolation is the Alaska oil pipeline. Secretary Schles-
inger recommended Northern Tier, EPA recommended Trans Mountain, the Department of
Defense favored Northwest Foothills, and the Department of State was neutral, Wilson,
supra note 131, at 26-27. Each agency's recommendation was based on its bureaucratic
orientation, a fulfillment of the axiom that "where you stand depends on where you sit."
The Public Utilities Regulatory Act (see text accompanying note 134 supra) attempted to
overcome bureaucratic bias by placing the decision squarely with the President.
169. Grayson, supra note 29, at 27.
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dently of, and in some cases opposition to, each other. The reasons for
this are varied, but arise principally because of the individual and com-
mon histories of the countries, Mexican and Canadian fears of Ameri-
can domination, and the existing international responsibilities of each
country.
The demands for sovereignty and independence have historical
roots. Canada, the United States, and Mexico, after all, were created
by different European nations in their attempts to colonize the New
World. Canada was originally called New France and remained a
French colony until the end of the Seven Years War.170 Mexico was
known as New Spain until it gained its independence in 1821.'7' The
United States was a British colony, parts of which are still called New
England. The significance of these names, New France, New England,
and New Spain, cannot be overlooked in understanding the contempo-
rary differences between these countries. The New World was the bat-
tleground in the fight between the Old World powers.
The United States notion of "manifest destiny" further strained
these old world rivalries. Manifest destiny existed even before the
United States became independent of Britain. Benjamin Franklin
wrote that "With Canada in our possession... our people in America
will increase amazingly."'1 2 The doctrine became even more pro-
nounced after the United States achieved independence. Thomas Jef-
ferson once wrote to James Monroe concerning Mexico and South
America: "However our present interests may restrain us within our
limits it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our
rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits and cover
the whole northern, if not the southern continent."' 
73
Canada and Mexico naturally viewed manifest destiny as a threat
to their very existence. These views were confirmed by the several
United States attempts to invade their countries. 74 Many Canadians
170. The Seven Years War is also known as the French and Indian War. Under the
terms of the Treaty of Paris, France ceded all of its land east of the Mississippi to Britain
and the Louisiana Territory to Spain.
171. New Spain, until 1700, included Mexico, the Philippine Islands, some Caribbean
islands, Central America as far south as Panama, Florida, parts of Georgia, and most of the
United States' Southwest.
172. C. MARTIN, FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN NATIONHOOD 10 (1955). Franklin also
paraphrased Cato's words in describing Rome's view of Carthage: "Canada delenda est"
(Canada must be destroyed). Id. Although he spoke these words when Canada was still a
French colony, it is not surprising that Canadians remembered the attitude after they be-
came British subjects.
173. J. CALLAHAN, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN MEXICAN RELATIONS 2 (1932).
174. For example, the first decision of the Continental Congress was not to declare inde-
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and Mexicans became firmly convinced that the United States intended
to overtake and colonize them.
The fears of military invasion subsided during this century but the
fears of United States domination continued. The United States influ-
ence in Canada and Mexico became more subtle and more pervasive,
taking the form of economic activity. United States companies began
to invest heavily in Canadian and Mexican economies. This invest-
ment, compounded by the volume of trade, raised fears in Canada and
Mexico that they were becoming economic satellites of the United
States. Canada and Mexico responded with economic nationalism.
PEMEX, Petro-Canada, Mexicanization, and the Foreign Investment
Review Agency all can be seen as Canadian and Mexican attempts to
control, or at least to limit, the dominant United States influences on
their economies.
These historical factors are one reason that Canada and Mexico
will not cooperate more fully with the United States without adequate
guarantees for their sovereignty and independence. Sovereignty and
independence must also be retained by all three countries because of
their sometimes conflicting national policies and their divergent inter-
national obligations.
Canada, the United States, and Mexico approach each other cau-
tiously because of internal conflicts regarding the appropriate levels of
cooperation. Powerful groups in the United States for example, could
be expected to oppose free trade with Canada and Mexico. 7' Differ-
ences in Canadian opinion are more regional in character. 76 The Que-
pendence, but to authorize an invasion of Canada. American military threats to Canada
subsided quickly, compared to American activity in Mexico. In 1846, the United States
declared war against Mexico. It seized New Mexico and California and ultimately captured
Mexico City. The United States occupied Veracruz in 1914 in reponse to alleged Mexican
interference with American rights. Two years later General Pershing, with 15,000 troops,
pursued Pancho Villa throughout northern Mexico.
175. Organized labor is vitally concerned with trade policy and, in particular, is con.
cerned that American business will move elsewhere to take advantage of lower wage costs.
These groups can exert tremendous political pressure for more protectionist trade policies.
Wash. Post., Oct. 24, 1979, § E, at 1, col. 6.
176. One commentator concludes:
. . . [the Canadian government] is certainly not assured of support from all regions
or sectors of Canadian society. In this respect it is not language so much as eco-
nomics which divide the country. . . The significant variation, rather, is between
the highly developed regions and those, such as the Maritimes, which are anxious
to attract development capital. A strongly nationalistic posture at the federal level,
then, runs the risk of exacerbating regional political and economic differences and
being undermined by the policies of provincial governments. In its dealings with
Canada, the American government rarely faces such problems.
C. PENTLAND, supra note 6, at 16.
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bec question fundamentally affects Canadian policy.",7 Disputes in
Mexico are more political and reflect the economic disparities within
that country." 8 These internal disputes make it politically essential
that all three countries preserve their rights of independent action.
Otherwise, future cooperation will be impossible.
Sovereignty and independence are also required because of the di-
vergent foreign policies and responsibilities of the three countries. Ca-
nada has a European orientation in trade and in diplomacy. It retains
this perspective partly for historical reasons,"79 and partly because Eu-
rope represents a political and economic counterweight to the United
States. Canada also fears becoming excessively entangled in Western
Hemisphere affairs.' The United States cannot afford to turn inward
to the extent that it loses its world position. United States trade policy
is a product of its foreign policy and excessive reliance on North Amer-
ican trade would damage United States' foreign policy in other parts of
the world. 8' Mexico sees itself as an emerging third world power. It is
177. The Quebec question refers to the recent referendum on separation of Quebec from
Canada. Quebec defeated the referendum by a wide margin in May 1980. The precise issue
was whether Quebec should negotiate a new agreement with Canada under which Quebec
would have become a sovereign state within a Quebec-Canada common market.
The issues surrounding Quebec separatism are enormously complex and include histor-
ical, linguistic, and economic factors. The only point to be made here is that the issues of a
North American Community and the future of Canada are interrelated. Canada cannot go
too far in cooperating with the United States for fear of destroying its economic and political
consensus. See generally Gilpin, Integration and Disintegration on the North Amercan Conti-
nent, in CANADA & THE U.S.: TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
259 (A. Fox, A. Hero, Jr., J. Nye ed. 1976).
178. The natural gas controversy is a good example. See text accompanying notes 153-
165 supra. Opponents in Mexico of the natural gas agreement argued that the gas pipeline
was comparable to the Panama Canal. It would be stategically important, thus making it
subject to seizure by the United States. In addition, Herbert Castillo, leader of the Mexican
Workers' party, and The National Front for the Protection of Natural Resources, a coalition
of Marxist organizations, argued that the gas should be available for shipment to many
countries, not just the United States. Finally, Castillo and The National Front demanded a
Mexican energy policy which would benefit all of the Mexican people, particularly the poor.
Grayson, supra note 29, at 13.
179. Canada retained its ties to Great Britain long after the United States became in-
dependent. See note 14 supra. It still has considerable trade with Great Britain. even
though Britain is now a member of the European Economic Community. See note 188
infra.
180. Canada, for example, is not a full member of the Organization of American States.
OAS, in the opinion of one author, "offers Canada the unpalatable choice of exacerbating
conflicts with the United States by lining up with smaller members with whom she has few
common ties, or supporting the Americans and being perceived as a miniature North Ameri-
can colonial power." C. PENTLAND, supra note 6, at 32.
181. Energy, in particular, may cause a chain reaction:
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interested in developing independent, rather than pro-United States or
pro-Marxist options for Central America." 2 Mexico seems to be mov-
ing in the direction of using its oil to become an independent force in
world affairs.'1 3 Thus, the countries perceive themselves as having dif-
ferent roles in world affairs. None of them has an interest in totally
changing its foreign policy. The three North American Community
partners, therefore, must preserve their ability to pursue different for-
eign policies.
Preservation of sovereignty and independence along with the pro-
motion of continued cooperation and encouragement of comprehen-
sive, trilateral problem-solving are the three most important goals of
the North American Community. An organization which accom-
plished these goals would be of enormous benefit to all three countries,
and it would help to maintain the very delicate balance between eco-
nomic interdependence and political independence. The next question
concerns the form such an organization should take. What organiza-
tional structure is best designed to accomplish the countries' goals with-
out upsetting the balance in their relationships?
IV. THE SHAPE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY
A regional organization,8 4 such as the North American Commu-
nity, could take one of two general forms: an integrated organiza-
tion,185 along the lines of the European Economic Community, or a
[a continental energy policy] would also have serious effects on Europe's energy
position, for the degree of access the United States gains to Canadian resources will
surely determine in great part America's interest in undertaking concerted action
with Japan and Western Europe to ensure stable and economical energy supplies
from other parts of the world. In energy, as in trade generally, a freer North Amer-
ican market, particularly if exclusive, might have adverse effects on Europe's eco-
nomic security.
Id. at 5.
182. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1980, § A, at 2, col. 3.
183. As evidence of Mexico's new independent stature, it recently took a seat on the U.N.
Security Council. Id.
184. A regional organization is defined by one author as "a segment of the world bound
together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic, or
political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in formal intergovernmental
agreements." A.L. BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES,
289 (1977).
185. As used in this paper, countries with an integrated relationship transfer their dcci-
sionmaking power in some areas to a supranational institution. Political integration has
been defined as the process by which:
governments begin to do together what they used to do individually; namely, they
set up collective decision-making processes that in greater or lesser degree handle
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cooperative organization, 8 6 similar to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Determining which is the most appro-
priate model for the North American Community requires an analysis
of the structure and function of the two types of organizations.
Integration: The Common Market Model
In the past, most commentators have discussed the new relation-
ship of Canada, the United States, and Mexico under the rubric "North
American Common Market" or "North American Common Market
For Energy."1"7 The European Economic Community has been held
up as a model for such an organization. A common market, however,
is not feasible in North America for some reasons which have been
discussed previously and for others which have never been fully ana-
lyzed.
The European Economic Community' 88 is both a political and an
economic organization. Economically, the EEC sets common external
tariffs, eliminates infernal trade barriers, and promotes the free move-
ment of capital and labor within the market area.' 89 The political goal
of the EEC is to bring the Member States closer together, and in the
view of some proponents, to eventually unify them.190 In essence, the
actions, engage in behaviors, and make allocations of goods or values that used to
be done (or not done) autonomously by governments or their agencies.
L. LINDBERG, Political Integration As a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Mulif. Varl-
ate Measurement, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 59 (L Lindberg &
S. Scheingold ed. 1971). But cf. Haas, International Integratiom The European and the Uni-
versalProcess, 15 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 366-67 (1961) (the author views integra-
tion as the process by which political actors transfer their political loyalty to a new
supranational institution.).
186. Countries with a cooperative relationship retain all of their decision-making power.
The supranational institution, if any, serves as a forum for discussion and negotiation. A
cooperative organization generally does not have the power to act on its own and, in those
cases in which it does have that power, the authority cannot be activated without the consent
of all members. For a discussion of a cooperative organization, see notes 232-255 i.fra.
187. See, ag., Hill, supra note 2.
188. The EEC was formed in 1957. The original members of the EEC ('The Six") were
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Britain, Ireland,
and Denmark joined in 1973. [1980] EuR. Y.B. at 178.
189. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, No. 4300, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 3, repinted in 51
AM. J. OF INT'L L. 865 (1957) [hereinafter "The Treaty"]. Article 2 of the Treaty states:
The Community's mission shall be, by establishing a common market and gradu-
ally removing differences between the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community the harmonious development of economic
activities, continuous and balanced expansion, increased stability, a more rapid
improvement in the standard of living and closer relations between its Member
States.
190. M. SiANKS & J. LAMBERT, THE COMMON MARKET TODAY AND ToMioRRow
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EEC seeks to achieve its economic goals through the operation of a
political organization.
The EEC consists of four institutions which basically correspond
to the three branches of government. 91 The Commission is similar to
the executive branch of government, in that it often proposes and exe-
cutes the Community's decisions. 19 The Commission is the most inte-
grated institution in the Community. 193 The Council of Ministers
serves a legislative function in that it establishes policy for the Commu-
nity.' 94 The Council consists of one representative of each Member
(1962). The founders of the EEC disagreed on the ultimate political goals of the organiza-
tion. Advocates of a European union, such as Jean Monnet, believed that economic integra-
tion was the first step in eventually unifying Europe into one nation. See Id. at 179,
Confederationists, especially Charles de Gaulle, wanted an integrated Europe with the prin-
cipal emphasis on the nation-state. His position was that "[t]he States are the only entities
which have the right to give orders and the power to be obeyed. To imagine that something
can be built up which can act effectively and be approved by the peoples outside or over and
above the State, is an illusion." See id. at 170.
The EEC is not the first effort to join the western European nations. The first and
second Roman Empires included many portions of the EEC. A proposal for European
union was made to the League of Nations in 1929. The proposal faded, however, with the
rise of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy. The movement was renewed after
World War II as the European nations began to see integration as the only way to avoid
another such internecine war. The first success was the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC). The ECSC integrated the highly sensitive and militarily significant coal, iron,
and steel industries of the western European countries. The ECSC eventually merged with
the EEC after its establishment in 1957. See A. KERR, THE COMMON MARKET AND How IT
WORKS 1-7 (1977).
191. The political structure of the EEC is what makes it an integrated organization. It is
integrated because it has a strong, centralized decision-making power. The EEC has the
power to make and act upon decisions independently of its Member States. See The Treaty,
supra note 189.
192. The Commission, under certain conditions, has the exclusive power to propose leg-
islation. See The Treaty, supra note 189, arts. 43 & 51. The Council of Ministers cannot act
on any proposal unless submitted to it by the Commission. The Council cannot even amend
a Commission's proposal except by unanimous vote. See id. art. 149.
193. The Commission is designed to represent the interests of the Community and not of
the Member States. The nine members of the Commission are appointed by agreement of
the members on the basis of "general competence and unquestioned integrity." Id. art.
157(1). The Commissioners must "carry out their function in complete independence, in the
general interest of the Community." Id. art. 157(2). The Commissioners:
In the discharge of their duties. . . shall neither ask for nor accept instruc-
tions from any Government or other body and shall refrain from all action incom-
patible with the character of their functions. Each Member State shall undertake
to respect this character and not to seek to influence the members of the Commis-
sion in the performance of their task.
Id.
194. The Council may act in one of several ways and its actions may affect members or
individuals. The Community may adopt regulations which "shall be general in their scope,
obligatory in all their parts and directly applicable in each Member State. [Directives] shall
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State. Major decisions concerning the establishment of the EEC's ini-
tial framework required adoption by unanimous vote of the Council. 95
Since the initial formation stages, additional modifications are decided
by a vote of the prescribed majority.' 96 The third major institution is
the European Court of Justice. The Court consists of seven judges
197
and has the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty and actions
taken under it.198 Finally, the Treaty creates the European Assembly, a
consultative body with very limited powers' 99 These institutions are
integrated because, taken collectively, they supersede the powers of the
respective Member States and because, at least in the case of the Corn-
bind every Member State to which they are addressed so far as concerns the result to be
achieved, but shall leave to the competence of national authorities questions of forms and
means." The Treaty, supra note 189, art. 189. Recommendations and opinions, the least
important action of the Community, have no binding force. Id. Decisions of the Commu-
nity that impose pecuniary obligations are enforceable in each state according to the mem-
ber's general rules of civil procedure. Id. art. 192.
195. See, e.g., The Treaty, supra note 189, art. 28 (establishment of common customs
tarifi); art. 43 (implementation of common agricultural policy); art. 51 (system to permit free
movement of migrant workers).
Unanimity on important issues is required. France, in particular refused to yield its
national rights and forced upon the Community the so-called Luxembourg Compromise.
That agreement provides, in part: "the French delegation considers that, when very impor-
tant interests are concerned, discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement has
been reached." E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTic AREA 111,
112 (1967). Not all of the other members accepted this statement and the issue remains
unresolved. Kozyris, National and Supernational Law in the EEC on the Eve of British Entry,
37 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 286, 290 (1972).
196. See, eg., The Treaty, supra note 189, arts. 28, 43, & 75. Article 148 provides that:
"Except where otherwise provided in the present Treaty, decisions of the Council shall be
taken by a majority of its members."
197. The judges are chosen for six year terms from among persons "of unquestioned
impartiality who fulfill the conditions required in their respective countries for the holding
of the highest legal offices or who are legal experts of wide repute." The Treaty, .upra note
189, art. 167.
198. See The Treaty, supra note 189, art. 164. The Court also has wide-ranging power to
command action by the Commission, the Council, the Member States or other organs of the
community, individuals, or legal entities. See id. arts. 169-188.
199. The Assembly reviews and comments upon the proposals of the Commission. The
Assembly does have limited taxing power, the power to dismiss (fire) the Commission itself
by a 2/3 vote, and veto power over the discretionary 17% of the 12 billion dollar budget for
the various European community entities. Mollison, The first Eurovote, THE NEW LEADER,
July 2, 1979, at 12.
Some commentators see the Assembly as the forerunner to a European Parliament.
The members of the Assembly were originally appointed by the member governments.
Since 1979, the members have been popularly elected. Id. at 11. Although the powers of the
Assembly are basically unchanged, many commentators believe that it will achieve more
political stature. Nielsen, Europe's First Election, NEwswEEK, June 11, 1979, at 64; Electing
a New Parliament, TIME, June 11, 1979, at 43.
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mission, they do not need the unanimous approval of the Member
States to act.
The Treaty describes in elaborate detail how these institutions will
accomplish the economic goals of the Community. Twenty-six articles
are devoted to the creation of the customs union, that is, the elimina-
tion of internal trade barriers and the creation of common external tar-
iffs.200 A like number of articles are devoted to the elimination of
barriers to the free movement of persons, services, and capital.201
These mechanisms, although extremely complicated, seem to have
worked well in practice.
20 2
The European Economic Community, by most accounts, has been
an economic and political success. Its economic success, especially in
the first 10 years, was marked. The combined gross national product
(GNP) of the Six increased by 95% between 1961 and 1971; while in the
United States and Great Britain the GNPs grew 61% and 42% respec-
tively.20 3 In the same period, imports rose 108% while exports rose by
118%.2 4 Although the EEC has recently suffered from some of the
same economic ills as the rest of the world, including trade deficits and
inflation, these figures illustrate the success and future potential of the
EEC.
Despite the political and economic successes of the EEC, however,
it is unlikely that the European experience can be transferred to North
200. The Treaty, supra note 189, arts. 12-37.
201. Id. arts. 48-73.
202. As one example, the Community has established a Common Agricultural Policy,
the purposes of which are to increase productivity, guarantee a fair income for the farming
population, stabilize markets, establish secure supplies, and ensure reasonable prices to con-
sumers. See id. art. 29. To set farm prices, the Community established a "target" for most
products. The target is the price which farmers should get on the open market. The Com-
munity also establishes a "threshold price" for similar goods which are being imported to
the Community from other nations. The threshold is that price at which the goods should
come into the EEC so as not to injure the European farmers and, if possible, give Europeans
a slight preference.
The Commission then observes prices at which imported goods come into the Commu-
nity, and if they come in below the threshold price, sets import levies as a corrective meas-
ure. In the event of a shortage, the Community can help consumers by abolishing import
levies, and if the situation warrants, by granting import subsidies, imposing export levies,
and, in the most extreme cases, prohibiting the export of the scarce product. KERR, supmsa
note 190, at 65.
Thus, the Common Agricultural Policy essentially eliminates all trade barriers to agri-
cultural products between the states. It also creates a common tariff, in the form of duties
and levies, for agricultural goods from countries outside of the Community.
203. Common Market: Great Dayfor Europe, TIME, Nov. 8, 1971, at 37.
204. S. DE LA MAHOT&R,TowARDS ONE EUROPE 37 (1970).
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America due to economic, legal, and political reasons, some of which
are discussed below.
Economic Problems with a North American Common Market
Theoretically, the economies of all three North American coun-
tries would benefit by the creation of a common market.205 The expan-
sion of markets, economies of scale, and the resulting increased
strength of the area make a common market seem like very sound pol-
icy. The disparities in economic strength and development of these
countries, however, would make a common market economically un-
feasible.
A common market, if it is to succeed, cannot be dominated by one
member. The EEC, for example, has several members of more or less
equal economic strength.' 6 Other common markets, which lack this
element, have not fared as well as the EEC.2 7 It is likely that the prob-
205. Cf., Carl & Johnson, Venezuela andthe Andean Common Mtarket, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L
AND POL'Y 151-152 (1978) (The author summarizes the basic economic argument in favor of
formation of regional common markets.).
206. The following charts rank the GNP and per capita GNP of the Member States.
1976 GNP (Millions) 1976 Per Capita GNP
West Germany 457,540 Denmark 7,450
France 346,730 West Germany 7,380
United Kingdom 225,150 Belgium 6,780
Italy 171,250 France 6,550
Netherlands 85,320 Luxembourg 6.460
Belgium 66,660 Netherlands 6,200
Denmark 37,770 United Kingdom 4,020
Ireland 8,090 Italy 3,050
Luxembourg 2,330 Ireland 2,560
International Comparisons, [1979] EuR. Y.B. XVII
West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are competitive in terms of total
GNP, although West Germany is exceedingly strong. In fact, West Germany's strength is
one reason France finally relented and allowed Britain to join the EEC. France felt that
Britain could help balance Germany's power. KERR, supra note 190, at 9. It is also interest-
ing to note that the rankings for total GNP and per capita GNP are quite different. Luxem-
bourg and Denmark, although small countries, have relatively high per capita GNPs. The
reverse is true for Italy and Britain. Thus, in the EEC there are several powerful countries,
and the powerful countries are not necessarily the richest ones in terms of per capita income.
207. The Andean Common Market, for example, has languished for several years be-
cause the members cannot agree on priorities. Ferris, National Political Supportfor Regional
Integration: the Andean Pact, 33 INT'L ORGANIZATIONS 83, 84-85 (1979). Venezuela, the
strongest member, seeks to strengthen the organization's program for industrialization. In-
deed, Venezuela joined the organization in part because it knew that it could dominate the
other countries. Carl & Johnson, supra note 205, at 156. Bolivia and Ecuador, both under-
developed, are primarily concerned with improving their position vis-a-vis the other mem-
bers. Colombia is primarily concerned with tariff reduction measures. Since the countries
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lem of one member domination would occur in a North American
Common Market because of the economic strength of the United
States.2 os
In addition to differences in economic strength, differences in eco-
nomic development make a North American common market unfeasi-
ble. The United States is the most industrialized country in the world.
Canada is also highly industrialized. Mexico, however, is in the proc-
ess of industrializing. These differences are reflected in the trade poli-
cies of the three countries. Theoretically, the elimination of internal
trade barriers and the establishment of common tariffs would tend to
equalize these differences and would aid the development of the
weaker members.2 0 9 In reality, the opposite seems to be true.2 t0 The
World Bank, in its report on the Commonwealth Caribbean, posits sev-
eral reasons for this discrepancy:
cannot agree on the highest priority, they have not moved very quickly in any of the areas,
Ferris, supra, at 85-86.
With reference to the question of one member-domination, it is interesting to note that
the ANCOM countries split from the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) for
precisely that reason. Brazil, the most industrialized country in LAFTA, benefitted the most
from the liberalization of trade. From 1962-1964 to 1976, Brazil's share of intra-regional
exports increased by 20%, while imports decreased by 12%. The ANCOM countries (then
including Chile) suffered a 3% drop in exports for the same period, while imports from the
region increased by 12%. Koopman, Ten Years Andean Pact: A Reexamination, INTER-
ECONOMICS, May/June 1979, at 116.
A similar problem exists in the Commonwealth Caribbean where Jamaica, Trinidad,
and Tobago account for approximtely 75% of the Gross Domestic Product and Intraregional
trade. S. CHERNIK, THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: THE INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE 23
(1978).
208. The following chart tells the story:
1978 Population 1978 GNP 1978
(million) (billions) Per Capita GNP
United States 218.6 $2,106.9 9,640
Canada 23.6 196.6 8,323
Mexico 66.4 76.2 1,147
The Planetary Product, DEP'T STATE SPECIAL REP., No. 58, 30, 43 (1979). The United
States ranks first, by a wide margin, in population, GNP, and per capita GNP. Indeed, the
United States' figures exceed the combined total of Canada and Mexico in each category.
By way of comparison, the 1978 GNP of the United States also exceeds the 1976 combined
GNP's of the EEC members.
209. The underlying theory is that business will move to the area where the costs of
production are lowest. In theory this means that industry would migrate to Mexico, and to
some extent Canada, until the cost of production was the same in all three countries, See
note 202 supra.
210. See note 207 supra regarding LAFTA. Brazil, the strongest member of LAFTA,
benefited the most from the liberalization of trade.
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Theoretically, it might be expected that the poorest areas within an
integrating community would be stimulated most from an elimina-
tion of barriers to trade, since they would tend to have relatively low
wages and would therefore be able to attract new industry from their
richer partners. It might also be expected that the consequent in-
crease in the demand for labor, and in incomes, in these areas would
help to equalize living standards among member countries. In most
integration schemes, however, the poorer members tend to lack infra-
structure and financial and manpower services. This problem may
more than offset low wage costs, so that new industry in fact gravi-
tates to more developed, rather than less developed, centers.
2 t t
The World Bank report goes on to explain some of the factors in
this process and concludes with a critique of the common market for-
mat:
The competitive advantages of the [more developed countries] in-
clude the size of their internal market; their attractive comparative
transport costs; their levels of business supporting services; their so-
cial and educational amenities; and other factors. There is a real risk
that, despite the 'new deal' for the [less developed countries], the es-
tablishment of a common market will result in the concentration of
economic activity in those countries that already have a head-start in
the development process.212
Thus, a common market is not as effective when its members have
widely different levels of economic strength and different levels of in-
dustrial development. This factor makes a North American common
market unfeasible.
Constitutional Problems
A common market is also unfeasible because the constitutions of
the United States and Mexico may bar them from entering into such an
arrangement.213 A common market, by definition, requires the exist-
ence of a supranational institution which has the power to act indepen-
211. S. CHERNIK, supra note 207, at 209-10.
212. Id. at 211.
213. Canada would appear not to share this constitutional problem because of its lack of
a written constitution and because of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. See gener-
ally P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 197-98 (1977). Moreover, Parliament is
given authority to "make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada,"
including laws regarding "[t]he regulation of Trade and Commerce." 30 CoNsTrrtmoNs OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Canada), British North American Act § 91(2). Section 91
allows Parliament to amend its provisions. Thus, even if there was otherwise a constitu-
tional problem, the Canadian Parliament could probably amend the acL See P. HoGo,
supra at 22.
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dently of its members. Such an institution would interfere with the
constitutional powers of the national governments in both countries.
The United States Constitution, for example, gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the sev-
eral states.214 The Mexican Constitution gives similar powers to the na-
tional government.215  A common market, therefore because of its
inherent power to regulate trade and tariffs for and among its mem-
bers,216 conflicts with the constitutional powers of the United States
and Mexican governments.21 7 The conflict is accentuated because,
under both constitutions, treaties and laws are both made "the supreme
law of the land. ' 218 Thus, the issue becomes whether a treaty which
transfers some of the national government's constitutional power to a
supranational organization is nevertheless valid as the supreme law of
214. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
215. Article 131 of the Mexican constitution provides, in part:
The federation has exclusive power to levy duties on goods that are imported
or exported or that pass in transit through the national territory...
The Executive may be empowered by the Congress or the Union to increase,
decrease, or abolish tariff rates on imports and exports that were imposed by the
Congress itself, and to establish others; likewise to restrict and to prohibit the im-
portation, exportation, or transit of articles, products, and goods, when he deems
this expedient for the purpose of regulating foreign commerce, the economy of the
country, the stability of domestic production, or for accomplishing any other pur-
pose to the benefit of the country.
9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 63-64 (1978).
216. In the EEC, for example, the Council has the authority, ultimately by majority vote,
to impose common tariffs on all member countries. The Treaty, supra note 189, art. 20.
217. The transfer of sovereignty to a common market would not be limited to the powers
of Congress. The Constitution gives the executive power to the President. A common mar-
ket may also usurp the President's role in government. In the EEC, the Commission serves
the executive function. The Commission has considerable authority, as demonstrated by the
Common Agricultural Policy, discussed above. Finally, a common market may also conflict
with the judicial power of the United States. The Constitution provides that the "judicial
power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of
the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." U.S.
CONST., art. 3, § 2, cl. I. The Court of Justice of the EEC has the sole power to interpret and
apply the treaty. The Treaty, supra note 180, arts. 164 & 177. Thus, United States courts
would no longer be able to interpret treaties to which the United States is a party. Hay,
Cooley & Moorehead, Problems of United States Participation in the European Common Mar.
ket, 23 U. PITT. L. REV. 595 (1962).
218. Article 6, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land. . ....
Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution is virtually identical: "This Constitution, the
laws of the Congress of the Union that emanate therefrom, and all treaties that have been
made and shall be made in accordance therewith by the President of the Republic, with the
approval of the Senate, shall be the supreme law of the whole union ...."
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the land. The answer appears to be that such a treaty, even though
entered into under the authority of the national government, is invalid
to the extent that it transfers powers to a supranational organization,
which powers would otherwise be retained by the national govern-
ment.21
The question of Congress' powers to transfer its authority to a su-
pranational agency was a controversial issue in the early 1950s. 2 2 The
219. It is interesting to note that this precise issue, supremacy of Community law over
national law, has not been finally resolved in the EEC. The EEC's view, as demonstrated by
the holdings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, supports the supremacy
of community law. The acceptance of this view in the domestic courts of the member na-
tions, however, is less clear and varies from complete concurrence (Holland) to complete
uncertainty (France). Kozyris, supra note 195, at 297. See A. AxutNE, EUROPEAN CO.M.MU-
NITY LAW AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 47-62 (1968).
220. See Perlman, On Amending the Treaty Power 52 COLUKn. LR. 825 (1952); Miller,
American Paricfation in Multinational Economic Institutions: A Problet in Constitutional
Law andPolicy 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 325. The issue arose with respect to the so-called Brick-
er Amendment. Many legislators were concerned that the United States was becoming
overly involved with international affairs after the end of World War II. Section 2 of the
Bricker Amendment would have prohibited any treaty from vesting in an international or-
ganization "any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested by this Constitution in
the Congress, the President, and in the courts of the United States." Perlman, supra, at 830.
Proponents of the amendment pointed to language in two Supreme Court opinions as dem-
onstrating the need for the constitutional revision. In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), the Supreme Court upheld a treaty with Canada for the protection of migratory birds
even though the Court had previously held that Congress could not legislate in this field. In
so ruling, the Court stated that: "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made
under the authority of the United States." 252 U.S. at 433.
This phrase, it was argued, implied that treaties, unlike statutes, were not subject to
constitutional limitations. Proponents of the Bricker Amendment also cited U.S. v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) in which the Court upheld a joint resolution of
Congress which authorized the President to ban the sale of guns to Bolivia and Paraguay.
The Court stated:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in
the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary con-
comitants of nationality. ... As a member of the family of nations, the United
States has the right and power of the other members of the international family.
Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign.
299 U.S. at 318.
Again, the Court seemed to imply that the treaty power was above constitutional limita-
tions. Proponents of the Amendment did not accept the limitations on the language in both
opinions. In Curtiss- Wright, the Court also stated that the "power of the President in the
field of international relations. . . like every other governmental power, must be exercised
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 299 U.S. at 320.
In Missouri, the Court also said "[w]e do not mean to imply that there are no qualifica-
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Supreme Court seemed to resolve the matter in Reid v. Covert221 when
it stated:
[No] agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Con-
gress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution .... There is nothing in [the] lan-
guage [of the Supremacy Clause] which intimates that treaties and
laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provi-
sions of the Constitution. Nor is there anything in the debates which
accompanied the drafting and ratification of the Constitution which
even suggests such a result. . . It would be manifestly contrary to
the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those
who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our
entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as
permitting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect,
such construction would permit amendment of that document in a
manner not sanctioned by Article V. . . . It would [also] be com-
pletely anomalous to say that a treaty need not comply with the Con-
stitution when such an agreement can be overridden by a statute that
must conform to that instrument.222
Thus, the Court clearly stated that treaties cannot be used to
amend the Constitution nor can they be approved without compliance
with constitutional requirements. Under Reid, then, the United States
could not enter a common market without first amending its Constitu-
tion.223
A common market cannot work under the Constitution for an-
other reason. Politically, if not functionally, a common market must
tions to the treaty-making power," and added "that the treaty in question does not contra-
vene any prohibitory words to be found in the constitution." 252 U.S. at 433.
Thus, both opinions indicate that there are some limitations on the treaty power. Nev-
ertheless, many felt that a new constitutional amendment was needed.
221. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
222. Id. at 16-18. In Reid, the Supreme Court ruled that an unconstitutional executive
agreement could not be upheld. In that case, the defendant killed her husband, a sergeant in
the Air Force, at an airbase in England. She was tried by the military authorities pursuant
to an executive agreement with England that allowed United States military courts to excr-
cise exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses. The defendant, according to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, was not allowed a trial by jury nor was she given other protections
afforded by the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court, in ruling for the defendant, rejected the
government's contention that the application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was
constitutionally permissible because the executive agreement between the United States and
England did not provide for various rights guaranteed civilians under the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. Id. at 15-16.
223. See Hay, Cooley & Moorhead, supra note 217, at 637-69 for a more detailed discus-
sion of the constitutional issues.
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have perpetual existence. Otherwise, it cannot gain the power, prestige,
and leverage to accomplish its goals. 24 A North American common
market cannot be assured such continuity, however, under the United
States Constitution. This is so because a subsequent act of Congress
may supersede a prior treaty.' Congress could negate the entire basis
of the common market through subsequent legislation. Canada and
Mexico would not have any redress for such action.
A North American Common Market and GA YT
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)2 6 is a mul-
tilateral trade agreement signed by over 100 nations. 27 Its principal
underlying goals are the promotion of free trade and the elimination of
discriminatory or preferential trade policies between the members. The
cornerstone of the GATT system is the concept of "most favored na-
tion" status by which is meant "any advantage, favour, privilege, or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be awarded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties." 228
Thus, members of GATT agree to treat each other equally and
fairly in international trade matters. A common market, by definition,
conflicts with these GATT principles. It establishes a preferential sys-
224. The EEC, for example, continues for an indefinite period. Treaty of Rome, supra
note 189, art. 3. Amendments are allowed but only enter into force if there is unanimous
agreement among the member nations. Id. art. 236.
225. The Cherokee Tobacco 78 U.S. (I 1 Wall.) 616 (1870). The Court ruled, in that case,
that an internal revenue act which provided for a tax on tobacco superseded a prior treaty
with the Cherokee nation that exempted all goods produced by Cherokee farmers from any
form of tax:
It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held
valid if it be in violation of that instrument. This results from the nature and fun-
damental principles of our government. The effect of treaties and acts of Congress,
when in conflict, is not settled by the Constitution. But the question is not involved
ia any doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act of Con-
gress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.
Id. at 620.
See aIso Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Annot., 4 A.LR. 1377, 1384-85
(1919).
226. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) and (6),
TIAS No. 1700.
227. The GATT members represent Africa (36 countries); North and South America (29
countries); Asia (19 countries); Australia (6 countries); and Europe (26 countries). The U.S.
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tern in which the members extend concessions to each otherwhich are
not given to countries outside of the common market.
GATT allows a waiver of its rules for a common market if certain
conditions are met.229 A customs union, to comply with GATT, must
mean that:
... the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed by, or
any margin of preference maintained by, any such union or agree-
ment in respect of trade with other contracting parties shall not on
the whole be higher or more stringent than the average level of the
duties and regulations of commerce or margins of preference appli-
cable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such
union or the adoption of such agreement.
230
This requirement may be practically impossible to meet because of
the different tariff policies in Canada, Mexico and the United States.
Even assuming all the conditions can be met, the common market
would cut against the policies of at least the United States and Canada.
Both are firm supporters of free trade, particularly in the multilateral
setting. The United States has been critical of regional trading blocs in
the past.231 It is clear that the North American common market would
injure, perhaps mortally, the movement for international free trade.
229. Art. XXIV allows the exemption for a customs union, which is defined as:
the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so
that all tariffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce as between the territo-
ries of members of the union are substantially eliminated and substantially the
same tariffs and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members
of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union.
Id. at art. XXIV.
The members of the customs union must notify GATT so that the other members of
GATT can decide whether it is "likely to result in the formation of a customs union. ,
within the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is. . . a
reasonable one." The GATT members can refuse to sanction the customs union if this con-
dition is not met.
230. Id. The meaning of Article XXIV is not entirely clear. See . ALLEN, Tmia EURO-
PEAN COMMON MARKET AND GATT (1960) for a detailed analysis. Does "average level"
mean per product or tariffs on all products? The distinction is important. For example,
Mexico might have a 40% tariff on Product A, Canada-20%, the U.S.-10%. The tariffs on
Product B could be 30%, 20%, 5% respectively. The average tariff on Product A would be
approximately 23% and on Product B 18%. The average for A and B would be 21%. Under
either interpretation, Mexico must lower its tariffs and the United States must raise its.
However, the change varies depending on which interpretation is accepted.
Mexico would be the clear loser in this example. The United States and Canada would
receive further protection from imports because in each case their tariffs are lower than the
average. Moreover, because a common market means free trade within the area, Canada
and the United States could increase the shipment of their lower-cost goods to Mexico. This
would further injure Mexico's already underdeveloped economy.
231. Cf. S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 83-85 (1974). Over 67% of the mem-
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V. THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: A
COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION
A cooperative organization is a more appropriate form for the
North American Community, because such an entity has fewer
problems and more flexibility than an integrated organization such as a
common market. A cooperative organization, by its very naturc, i. &
forum rather than a decision-making body. It requires unanimity of
the members before it can act. Therefore, it is less likely to upset the
economic and political balance, since the countries cannot be forced to
act without their consent. 32 Moreover, a cooperative organization
does not necessarily include all of the goals a common market would
be likely to pursue. In a cooperative organization, the members may
negotiate free trade agreements where appropriate, but are not required
to eliminate all of their trade barriers.3 Nor are they required to
standardize their trade policies vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Thus, a
cooperative organization would not be as beleaguered by the economic
and political problems as a North American common market.
Nevertheless, a cooperative organization would be equally as ef-
fective in accomplishing the goals of the North American Community.
The examples cited in the previous section-Mexican railcars and nat-
ural gas-all could have been resolved by the efforts of the three coun-
tries in the context of a cooperative organization. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a good example
of a cooperative organization, both in terms of its structure and its
function. The North American Community could be formed along the
lines of OECD.
bers of GATT now belong to such regional blocs. Roschke, The GAT7T- Prablems andPros.
pects, 12 J. INT'L L. AND EcoN. 85 (1977).
232. The EEC, for example, provides for majority voting in some cases. The Treaty.
supra note 189, art. 148. Thus, in a common market, the United States and Canada, the
United States and Mexico, or Canada and Mexico could force the other country to act. Th6
loss of sovereignty is simply unacceptable for the reasons discussed previously.
233. An example of the difference is the railcar controversy, discussed supra in text ac-
companying notes 119-126. A North American common market would mean that neither
the United States nor Mexico could impose tariffs on each other's railroad equipment.
Neither country may be willing to give up that right. In a cooperative organization, how-
ever, the United States and Mexico could negotiate a more individually tailored agreement.
The United States might agree to eliminate tariffs for a fixed period of time, until domestic
production equalled domestic demand. The United States could also lower, but not elimi-
nate, its tariff on Mexican railcars. This would give domestic producers some advantage, but
still not close Mexico out of the market.
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD was formed in 196034 and its members include most of the
western European nations,2 35 the United States, Canada, and Japan.
23 6
It was designed as a cooperative organization 237 for the achievement of
essentially economic goals. 238 The members of OECD agree to:
234. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Dec. 14, 1960,
12 U.S.T. 1960, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. OECD is the successor
to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. OEEC had been formed after
World War II to implement the Marshall Plan. By the late 1950s, most of OEEC's work had
been completed and some disagreement existed regarding the organization's future. Some
leaders saw OEEC as the device by which to create a merger of the EEC and the European
Free Trade Association. Others, particularly in France, wanted to abolish OEEC to elimi-
nate the prospect of a European free trade arrangement. Still others wanted to convert
OEEC into an "Atlantic" agency. Indeed, at the 1959 NATO Congress, the United States
strongly supported a resolution calling for the transformation of the OEEC into the Organi-
zation for Atlantic Economic Cooperation. The European neutrals-Sweden, Switzerland,
Austria, Ireland, and Spain-feared that the new organization would be confused with
NATO and the OAEC plan was dropped. Halperin, OECD.- A Promise of Unity, FORTUNE,
Feb. 2, 1961, at 71.
Early in 1960, the Group of Four on Economic Organization, including representatives
of OEEC, the United States, and Canada, proposed the creation of a new organization and
gave it the name of OECD. The name change implied two changes in the nature of OEEC.
First, the "European" element was deleted to allow membership of non-European nations
such as Canada, the United States, and Japan. "Development" was added to reflect the new
organization's concern for the development of less developed countries, A Convention was
drafted and signed by the members on December 14, 1960. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD: HISTORY, AIMS, STRUCTURE 9 (1971).
235. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, West Germany, Ireland, It-
aly, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.
236. Australia, New Zealand, and Yugoslavia hold special status memberships in
OECD.
237. The creation of OECD as a cooperative, rather than an integrated organization is
largely due to the efforts of the United States. The United States was not willing to yield any
power to a supranational organization. See BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 4, 1961, at 96. Indeed,
the Senate attached an "interpretation" of its advice and consent to the OECD convention
which provided that:
nothing in the convention, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratifica-
tion threof, confers any power on the Executive to bind the United States in sub-
stantive matters beyond what the Executive now has, or to bind the United States
without compliance with applicable procedures imposed by domestic law, or con-
fers any power on the Congress to take action in fields previously beyond the au-
thority of Congress, or limits Congress in the exercise of any power it now has.
107 CONG. REC. 4170 (1961).
The OECD convention reflects this American concern. Article 6 provides that: "No
decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of its
own constitutional procedures. The other Members may agree that such a decision shall
apply provisionally to them."
238. The general goals of the organization are stated in Article I of the OECD Conven-
tion, supra note 234:
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A) keep each other informed and furnish the Organisation with the
information necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks;
B) consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and par-
ticipate in agreed projects, and
C) co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-ordinated ac-
tion.239
The organizational structure of OECD is designed to accomplish
these goals. The OECD Convention created two institutions. The
Council, which is composed of one representative from each member,
is the body "from which all acts of the Organisation derive."2 40 The
Council has the power to make decisions, make recommendations to
Members, and enter into agreements with Members, non-Members,
and international organizations. 241 Decisions and recommendations
can only be made by "mutual agreement of all members." 42 The Con-
vention also provides for a Secretary-General who is appointed by and
responsible to the Council. The Secretary-General serves as the chair-
man of the Council. He or she may appoint a staff who, in keeping
a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a
rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial sta-
bility, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member
countries in the process of economic development; and
c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multi-lateral, non-discrimi-
natory basis in accordance with international obligations.
239. OECD Convention, supra note 234, art. 3. The communique which was issued
upon the signing of the OECD convention describes the purpose of OECD as being "the
forum in which twenty countries will consult, cooperate closely and where appropriate take
coordinated action to meet the economic tasks which face them today."
The communique also stated that:
It [OECD] will pay special attention to the international effects of national policies,
with a view to establishing a climate of mutual understanding conducive to the
harmonious adjustment of policies. These consultations will be a major activity in
pursuing the objective of economic growth, essential to enable the member coun-
tries to fulfill their responsibilities in the world economy. 42 CURRENT HISTORY
180 (1962).
240. OECD Convention, supra note 234, art. 7.
241. Id. art. 5.
242. Id. art. 6. A Member may also abstain from voting; in which case, the decision
binds all Members except for the one that abstains. Id. This latter provision provides for
considerable flexibility and the organization probably could not have survived without it.
Otherwise, one member could always stop any action. A good example is the creation of the
International Energy Agency, discussed in the text accompanying notes 249-255 infra. Fin-
land, France, and Greece all abstained from the decision and therefore are not members of
the agency. Woodlife, A New Dimension to International Cooperation" The OECD Interna-
tionalEnergy 4greement, 24 INT'L. AND COMp. L.Q. 525,527 (1975). Without provision for
abstention, the other countries could not have created the lEA under the auspices of the
OECD.
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with the international purpose of the organization, "shall neither seek
nor receive instructions from any of the Members from any Govern-
ment or authority external to the Organisation." 24 3 The Convention
also authorizes the creation of "such subsidiary bodies as may be re-
quired for the achievement of the aims of the Organisation. '24  The
Organization has formed over 100 committees, composed of senior offi-
cials from each government.245 These committees do much of the work
of OECD and prepare recommendations for the Council.
The functions of the Organization have changed over time. Dur-
ing the 1960's, OECD acted primarily as a clearinghouse for informa-
tion. Its highly qualified staff of economic experts prepared and issued
reports on a wide range of subjects of interest to the members. The
Organization still provides this important service.246 During the early
1970s, however, the essential role changed. It became more active and
truly began to serve its purpose of allowing the members to "cooperate
closely and, where appropriate, take coordinated action." One exam-
ple is the adoption of OECD's Guidelines for Multinalional Enter-
prises.24 7 Another is the creation of the International Energy Agency
243. OECD Convention, supra note 234, art. 11.
244. Id. art. 9.
245. The most important committees are (by issue area): Economic Affairs (Economic
Policy Committee, Economic and Development Review Committee; Environment (Environ-
ment Committee); Development Assistance (Development Assistance Committee, Technical
Cooperation Committee, and OECD Development Centre); International Trade (Trade
Committee); Financial Affairs (The Board of Management of the European Monetary
Agreement, Committee for Invisible Transactions, Payments Committee, Committee on Fi-
nancial Markets, Group of Financial Statisticians, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Insurance
Committee, Tourism Committee, Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,
Maritime Transport Committee, Committee for Consumer Policies, the Consortia for
Greece and Turkey); Science and Education (Committee for Science Policy, Committee for
Education, The Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, Steering Committee on
Road Research); Manpower and Social Affairs (Manpower and Social Affairs Committee);
Industry and Energy (Industry Committee, Energy Committee, Oil Committee); Agriculture
and Fisheries (Committee for Agriculture, Committee on Fisheries); Nuclear Energy (Euro-
pean Nuclear Energy Agency). OECD Convention, supra note 234.
246. For example, OECD recently issued a detailed report analyzing world food
problems in the 1980s and 1990s. The report concluded that major breakthroughs in tech-
nology are needed to prevent shortages in the next 20 years. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 23, 1980,
at 38, col. 2.
247. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976). See Maher, SupranatlonalReginesfor Mullina-
dional: The New Order with a New Face, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 289 (1979) for a full discussion
of the guidelines. The guidelines, although voluntary, are one of the first attempts by OECD
to involve itself in an extremely controversial area. Critics of the guidelines agree that they
are the "rich man's" effort to blunt the impact of the more prescriptive rules of the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development. See, Maher, supra, at 296.
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(LEA) under the auspices of OECD.248
The Agency was created in 1974 at the height of the Arab oil em-
bargo. The Agency was formed to achieve "consumer solidarity" in
response to the oil cartel.249 The western industrialized nations were
poorly prepared when the crisis broke out in 1973.250 Reliable infor-
mation was hard to obtain on the world energy situation and whatever
information did exist was not being shared. No plans had been made
for a joint sharing of petroleum in the event of a cut-off from the Mid-
East. Many countries were more concerned about maintaining their
supplies than with the disastrous effects if oil shipments to one or more
countries were halted." t Efforts were then begun to form a consumer's
cartel, in effect, to counteract the producer's cartel. The Agency was
the instrument chosen, principally at the instigation of the United
States. 2
The Agency has several goals, probably the most important of
which is the emergency reserve commitment.5 3 Each member agrees
to maintain reserves- sufficient to sustain internal consumption for 60
days. An arrangement is also made by which the members agree to
share or spread the consequences of any shortage which results from
the cut-off of supplies to one or more members. The fact that the mem-
bers agreed on this proposal is quite significant, considering the impor-
tance of energy to each country. The importance of energy also
explains the elaborate procedures necessary to the invocation of the
commitment. 4
248. Woodlife, supra note 242, at 533 n.62. Id. at 533.
249. The International Energy Program was intended to express "the determination of
the consumers not to remain vulnerable to outside pressures and to shape their own futures."
Id.
250. See Lantzke, The OECD and Its International Energy AgencA 104 DA EDALUS, 217
(1975) for an analysis of the events leading up to the formation of the lEA.
251. Id. at 220.
252. The United States wanted IEA to be an independent agency. The Gro ing Poerof
OECD, DuN's REv., Sept. 1976, at 74. It was formed under the auspices of OECD so that
France could be kept informed of its activites. France declined to join lEA because it saw
the organization as an "energy NATO". Woodlife, supra note 242, at 533 n.54. France is an
important consumer nation, however, and could be involved informally through the OECD
connection.
253. Other goals include the exchange of information and long-term cooperation on en-
ergy matters. Woodlife, supra note 242, at 532.
254. Invocation of the emergency allocation procedure is "automatic," in the sense that it
does not require a vote of the members. All other actions are taken under a voting system
which has been described as one of "the most complex yet devised for an international
organisation.' Woodlife, supra note 242, at 534. Three types of voting are allowed: una-
nimity, majority, and special majority. Unanimity is required for many major decisions.
Forms of majority voting, however, are provided for such important questions as whether to
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The Agency and, in particular, the emergency reserve system, il-
lustrates the value of a cooperative organization such as OECD. The
industrialized countries all depend on imported oil, to greater and
lesser extents and, therefore, must be principally interested in protect-
ing their sources of supply. Their individual interests are balanced by
their interdependence. The nations faced a difficult choice. Either they
could abandon their collective interests and seek the best possible indi-
vidual arrangements with the OPEC countries or they could band to-
gether and seek to minimize, if not destroy, the power of the cartel.
The Agency reflects a choice in favor of the latter alternative. OECD
was the forum in which the arrangement was negotiated. Even though
the emergency reserve system has never been fully tested, the mere fact
of its existence is a tribute to the potential of a cooperative organiza-
tion, such as OECD.255
The Organization is a good model for the North American Com-
munity. The Community could serve the same function as OECD,
namely, provide a forum in which the members can exchange informa-
tion, consult, and when appropriate, take coordinated action. Such an
organization would accomplish the goals of promoting continental co-
operation, encouraging comprehensive, trilateral problem-solving, and
preserving the sovereignty and independence of all three countries.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NORTH AMERICAN
COMMUNITY
This paper has demonstrated some of the practical benefits of the
deactivate the emergency procedures and the procedures for allocating oil in an emergency,
Majority voting is generally calculated as follows: Each member is given three "general"
voting weights. Each also gets "oil consumption" weights based on the amount of oil the
country uses. "Combined" weights are then allocated on the basis of the general and oil
consumption weights. For example, a vote of 60% of the combined weights and 36 general
weights (12 countries) must be achieved on the question of whether the emergency condi-
tions have been met. See Woodlife, supra note 242, at 535-36. This voting system, particu-
larly the majority vote provisions, represents a modified form of integration since majority
vote means that not all members must agree. But, majority vote does not apply to the most
important question, that is, whether to activate the system. No vote is required on that issue,
See id. at 535.
255. The seizure of American hostages in Iran may provoke the first test. See U.S. Alies
Hold Talks on Replacing Oil From Iran Without Global Bidding War, Wall St. J., April 24,
1980, at 4, col. 1. The United States wants its allies to impose trade sanctions on Iran, Iran
may respond by cutting off shipments to those countries. Last year, during the Iranian
revolution, many countries rushed into the spot market. Japan, in particular, was accused of
driving up the price of imported oil. The IEA met to discuss the situation and to determine




North American Community. The creation of such a problem-solving
forum would allow Canada, Mexico, and the United States to
strengthen and enhance the areas in which they cooperate without at
the same time jeopardizing their ability to act independently. To
achieve these somewhat contradictory goals, the North American Com-
munity must have two elements: broad jurisdiction and limited power
to act.
The North American Community should have jurisdiction to in-
quire into and act upon the issues which face the three countries. The
list of issues is immense but can be broken down into five general cate-
gories: trade, government regulation, economic policy, environmental
policy, and other matters.5 6 In essence, the Community will have ju-
risdiction over the entire range of relations and problems between and
among the three countries.
The Community's jurisdiction, however, will be limited by its nar-
rowly circumscribed power to act. The principles of equality and una-
nimity are critical to the success of the North American Community.
Canada, Mexico, and the United States must have an equal voice in the
Community's affairs. 57 Moreover, unanimity will be required to pre-
serve the sovereignty and independence of all three countries. 2
8
The North American Community should follow the structural
model of OECD. The Community Council should consist of one mem-
ber from each country. The Council should consist of the heads of
256. In the author's opinion, the Community should have the authority to deal with tar-
iffs, duties, dumping, quotas, balance of payments, foreign exchange between the member
countries and between members and other countries in the field of foreign exchange. The
Community should also have jurisdiction over economic policy, including immigration, la-
bor, capital transfer, natural resources, agriculture, industrial development, transportation,
energy, fishing, technology transfer, tourism, market access, water, and mining. In the field
of government regulation, the Community should consider the taxation laws of the mem-
bers, investment restrictions, boundaries, public works, licensing restrictions, domestic
purchase laws, territorial limits, and drug enforcement. Its environmental jurisdiction
should include air and water pollution and other matters such as endangered species. The
last category, other matters, is equally important so that the organization will have the flex-
ibility to deal with unforeseen issues which may arise.
257. Unequal voting strength would simply perpetuate the existing situation, i.e., Ameri-
can dominance. Canada and Mexico would refuse to participate in this type of organization.
Moreover, unequal voting power is irrelevant because of the unanimity requirement. Thus,
even if the United States had 50% of the votes, the unanimity element would eliminate the
possibility of common action if Canada or Mexico voted against the proposal.
258. This requirement does not mean that the Community can only act when all three
countries agree. Otherwise, one country could subvert the activites of the organization.
Unanimity is not required in the OECD since a country may abstain from the proposal. In
that case, the proposal takes effect but is not binding on the abstaining member. OECD
Convention, supra note 234.
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state for all three countries who would confer at least once every year
or every other year. At other times, the Council should consist of the
foreign ministers for the countries or other designated representatives.
The Community should also have its own staff, similar to the OECD
Secretariat.259 Finally, the Community charter should provide for the
creation of committees to perform its investigative and analytical work.
This outline of the structure of the North American Community is
not comprehensive, nor is it intended to be. The operations and proce-
dures of the organization must be negotiated by the three countries.
Nevertheless, certain elements are clearly needed. The Community
must have broad jurisdiction and limited power to act. These two ele-
ments are critical to the success of the Community.
The North American Community will be a practical organization
with very real goals. The Community, as proposed in this paper, will
be less than its most ardent supporters want but more important than
its detractors imagine. The Community will not change the world, but
it will change the nature of the relations between the North American
countries. Most importantly, the Community will symbolize the new
age of political and economic cooperation for Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.
259. Following the OECD model, the Secretary-General should report to the Council
and should be prohibited from seeking advice or taking orders from any country. See text
accompanying note 243 supra.
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